This is a purely informative rendering of an RFC that includes verified errata. This rendering may not be used as a reference.

The following 'Verified' errata have been incorporated in this document: EID 2649, EID 2839, EID 3130, EID 3259, EID 3626, EID 3692, EID 6806
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        P. Hoffman
Request for Comments: 5912                                VPN Consortium
Category: Informational                                        J. Schaad
ISSN: 2070-1721                                  Soaring Hawk Consulting
                                                               June 2010


 New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)

Abstract

   The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format,
   and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1.  The current
   ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1.  This document
   updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1.
   There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is
   simply a change to the syntax.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Design Notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  ASN.1 Module PKIX-CommonTypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  ASN.1 Module AlgorithmInformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 2560 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 2986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 3279 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 3852 (Attribute Certificate v1)  . . . .  34
   8.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 4055 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   9.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   10. ASN.1 Module for RFC 4211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   11. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5055 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   12. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5272 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
   13. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5755 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
   14. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5280, Explicit and Implicit  . . . . . .  91
   15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
   16. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

1.  Introduction

   Some developers would like the IETF to use the latest version of
   ASN.1 in its standards.  Most of the RFCs that relate to security
   protocols still use ASN.1 from the 1988 standard, which has been
   deprecated.  This is particularly true for the standards that relate
   to PKIX, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), and S/MIME.

   This document updates the following RFCs to use ASN.1 modules that
   conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1 [ASN1-2002].  Note that not all
   the modules are updated; some are included to simply make the set
   complete.

   o  RFC 2560, PKIX Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560]

   o  RFC 2986, PKCS #10 certificate request [RFC2986]

   o  RFC 3279, PKIX algorithms and identifier [RFC3279]

   o  RFC 3852, contains PKIX attribute certificates, version 1
      [RFC3852]

   o  RFC 4055, Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA
      Cryptography [RFC4055]

   o  RFC 4210, PKIX CMP (Certificate Management Protocol) [RFC4210]

   o  RFC 4211, PKIX CRMF (Certificate Request Message Format) [RFC4211]

   o  RFC 5055, PKIX SCVP (Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol)
      [RFC5055]

   o  RFC 5272, Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) [RFC5272]

   o  RFC 5280, PKIX certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
      profile [RFC5280] (both the implicit and explicit modules)

   o  RFC 5755, PKIX attribute certificates, version 2 [RFC5755]

   Note that some of the modules in this document get some of their
   definitions from places different than the modules in the original
   RFCs.  The idea is that these modules, when combined with the modules
   in [RFC5911] can stand on their own and do not need to import
   definitions from anywhere else.  Also note that the ASN.1 modules in
   this document have references in their text comments that need to be
   looked up in original RFCs, and that some of those references may
   have already been superseded by later RFCs.

   The document also includes a module of common definitions called
   "PKIX-CommonTypes".  These definitions are used here and in
   [RFC5911].

   The document also includes a module of common definitions called
   "AlgorithmInformation".  These definitions are used here and in
   [RFC5911].

1.1.  Design Notes

   The modules in this document use the object model available in the
   2002 ASN.1 documents to a great extent.  Objects for each of the
   different algorithm types are defined.  Also, all of the places where
   the 1988 ASN.1 syntax had ANY holes to allow for variable syntax now
   use objects.

   Much like the way that the PKIX and S/MIME working groups use the
   prefix of id- for object identifiers, this document has also adopted
   a set of two-, three-, and four-letter prefixes to allow for quick
   identification of the type of an object based on its name.  This
   allows, for example, the same back half of the name to be used for
   the different objects.  Thus, "id-sha1" is the object identifier,
   while "mda-sha1" is the message digest object for "sha1".

   One or more object sets for the different types of algorithms are
   defined.  A single consistent name for each different algorithm type
   is used.  For example, an object set named PublicKeys contains the
   public keys defined in that module.  If no public keys are defined,
   then the object set is not created.  When importing these object sets
   into an ASN.1 module, one needs to be able to distinguish between the
   different object sets with the same name.  This is done by using both
   the module name (as specified in the IMPORT statement) and the object
   set name.  For example, in the module for RFC 5280:

   PublicKeys FROM PKIXAlgs-2008 { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 995 }
   PublicKeys FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7  33 }

   PublicKeyAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { PKIXAlgs-2008.PublicKeys, ...,
       PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms.PublicKeys }

2.  ASN.1 Module PKIX-CommonTypes

   This section contains a module that is imported by many other modules
   in this document and in [RFC5911].  This module does not come from
   any existing RFC.

  PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

  DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
  BEGIN

  --  ATTRIBUTE
  --
  --  Describe the set of data associated with an attribute of some type
  --
  --  &id is an OID identifying the attribute
  --  &Type is the ASN.1 type structure for the attribute; not all
  --      attributes have a data structure, so this field is optional
  --  &minCount contains the minimum number of times the attribute can
  --      occur in an AttributeSet
  --  &maxCount contains the maximum number of times the attribute can
  --      appear in an AttributeSet
  --      Note: this cannot be automatically enforced as the field
  --      cannot be defaulted to MAX.
  --  &equality-match contains information about how matching should be
  --      done
  --
  --  Currently we are using two different prefixes for attributes.
  --
  --  at- for certificate attributes
  --  aa- for CMS attributes
  --

  ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS {
      &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
      &Type           OPTIONAL,
      &equality-match MATCHING-RULE OPTIONAL,
      &minCount       INTEGER DEFAULT 1,
      &maxCount       INTEGER OPTIONAL
  } WITH SYNTAX {
      [TYPE &Type]
      [EQUALITY MATCHING RULE &equality-match]
      [COUNTS [MIN &minCount] [MAX &maxCount]]
      IDENTIFIED BY &id
  }

  -- Specification of MATCHING-RULE information object class
  --

  MATCHING-RULE ::= CLASS {
    &ParentMatchingRules   MATCHING-RULE OPTIONAL,
    &AssertionType         OPTIONAL,
    &uniqueMatchIndicator  ATTRIBUTE OPTIONAL,
    &id                    OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
  }
  WITH SYNTAX {
    [PARENT &ParentMatchingRules]
    [SYNTAX &AssertionType]
    [UNIQUE-MATCH-INDICATOR &uniqueMatchIndicator]
    ID &id
  }

  --  AttributeSet
  --
  --  Used when a set of attributes is to occur.
  --
  --  type contains the identifier of the attribute
  --  values contains a set of values where the structure of the ASN.1
  --      is defined by the attribute
  --
  --  The parameter contains the set of objects describing
  --      those attributes that can occur in this location.
  --

  AttributeSet{ATTRIBUTE:AttrSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
      type      ATTRIBUTE.&id({AttrSet}),
      values    SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.
                    &Type({AttrSet}{@type})
  }

  --  SingleAttribute
  --
  --  Used for a single valued attribute
  --
  --  The parameter contains the set of objects describing the
  --      attributes that can occur in this location
  --

  SingleAttribute{ATTRIBUTE:AttrSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
      type      ATTRIBUTE.&id({AttrSet}),
      value     ATTRIBUTE.&Type({AttrSet}{@type})
  }

  --  EXTENSION

  --
  --  This class definition is used to describe the association of
  --      object identifier and ASN.1 type structure for extensions
  --
  --  All extensions are prefixed with ext-
  --
  --  &id contains the object identifier for the extension
  --  &ExtnType specifies the ASN.1 type structure for the extension
  --  &Critical contains the set of legal values for the critical field.
  --      This is normally {TRUE|FALSE} but in some instances may be
  --      restricted to just one of these values.
  --

  EXTENSION ::= CLASS {
      &id  OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
      &ExtnType,
      &Critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT {TRUE | FALSE }
  } WITH SYNTAX {
      SYNTAX &ExtnType IDENTIFIED BY &id
      [CRITICALITY &Critical]
  }

  --  Extensions
  --
  --  Used for a sequence of extensions.
  --
  --  The parameter contains the set of legal extensions that can
  --  occur in this sequence.
  --

  Extensions{EXTENSION:ExtensionSet} ::=
      SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension{{ExtensionSet}}

  --  Extension
  --
  --  Used for a single extension
  --
  --  The parameter contains the set of legal extensions that can
  --      occur in this extension.
  --
  --  The restriction on the critical field has been commented out
  --  the authors are not completely sure it is correct.
  --  The restriction could be done using custom code rather than
  --  compiler-generated code, however.
  --

  Extension{EXTENSION:ExtensionSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
      extnID      EXTENSION.&id({ExtensionSet}),
      critical    BOOLEAN
  --                     (EXTENSION.&Critical({ExtensionSet}{@extnID}))
                       DEFAULT FALSE,
      extnValue   OCTET STRING (CONTAINING
                  EXTENSION.&ExtnType({ExtensionSet}{@extnID}))
                  --  contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 value
                  --  corresponding to the extension type identified
                  --  by extnID
  }

  --  Security Category
  --
  --  Security categories are used both for specifying clearances and
  --  for labeling objects.  We move this here from RFC 3281 so that
  --  they will use a common single object class to express this
  --  information.
  --

  SECURITY-CATEGORY ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  SecurityCategory{SECURITY-CATEGORY:Supported} ::= SEQUENCE {
      type      [0]  IMPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY.
              &id({Supported}),
      value     [1]  EXPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY.
              &Type({Supported}{@type})
  }

  END

3.  ASN.1 Module AlgorithmInformation

   This section contains a module that is imported by many other modules
   in this document.  Note that this module is also given in [RFC5911].
   This module does not come from any existing RFC.

AlgorithmInformation-2009
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS

KeyUsage
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
    {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)

    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} ;

--  Suggested prefixes for algorithm objects are:
--
--  mda-   Message Digest Algorithms
--  sa-    Signature Algorithms
--  kta-   Key Transport Algorithms (Asymmetric)
--  kaa-   Key Agreement Algorithms  (Asymmetric)
--  kwa-   Key Wrap Algorithms (Symmetric)
--  kda-   Key Derivation Algorithms
--  maca-  Message Authentication Code Algorithms
--  pk-    Public Key
--  cea-   Content (symmetric) Encryption Algorithms
--  cap-   S/MIME Capabilities

ParamOptions ::= ENUMERATED {
   required,         -- Parameters MUST be encoded in structure
   preferredPresent, -- Parameters SHOULD be encoded in structure
   preferredAbsent,  -- Parameters SHOULD NOT be encoded in structure
   absent,           -- Parameters MUST NOT be encoded in structure
   inheritable,      -- Parameters are inherited if not present
   optional,         -- Parameters MAY be encoded in the structure
   ...
}

--  DIGEST-ALGORITHM
--
--  Describes the basic information for ASN.1 and a digest
--      algorithm.
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the digest algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--
--  Additional information such as the length of the hash could have
--      been encoded.  Without a clear understanding of what information
--      is needed by applications, such extraneous information was not
--      considered to be of sufficent importance.
--
--  Example:
--  mda-sha1 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER id-sha1
--      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent
--  }

DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {

    &id                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params             OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence      ParamOptions DEFAULT absent
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence ]
}

--  SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a signature algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the signature algorithm
--  &Value - contains a type definition for the value structure of
--              the signature; if absent, implies that no ASN.1
--              encoding is performed on the value
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &HashSet - The set of hash algorithms used with this
--                  signature algorithm
--  &PublicKeySet - the set of public key algorithms for this
--                  signature algorithm
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  sig-RSA-PSS SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
--     IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS
--     PARAMS TYPE RSASSA-PSS-params ARE required
--     HASHES { mda-sha1 | mda-md5, ... }
--     PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsa-pss }
-- }

SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
    &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Value          OPTIONAL,
    &Params         OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &HashSet        DIGEST-ALGORITHM OPTIONAL,
    &PublicKeySet   PUBLIC-KEY OPTIONAL,
    &smimeCaps      SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [VALUE &Value]
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence ]
    [HASHES &HashSet]
    [PUBLIC-KEYS &PublicKeySet]

    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

--  PUBLIC-KEY
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a public key
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the public key
--  &KeyValue - contains the type for the key value
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &keyUsage - contains the set of bits that are legal for this
--              key type.  Note that is does not make any statement
--              about how bits may be paired.
--  &PrivateKey - contains a type structure for encoding the private
--              key information.
--
--  Example:
--  pk-rsa-pss PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS
--      KEY RSAPublicKey
--      PARAMS TYPE RSASSA-PSS-params ARE optional
--      CERT-KEY-USAGE { .... }
--  }

PUBLIC-KEY ::= CLASS {
    &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &KeyValue       OPTIONAL,
    &Params         OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &keyUsage       KeyUsage OPTIONAL,
    &PrivateKey     OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [KEY &KeyValue]
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [CERT-KEY-USAGE &keyUsage]
    [PRIVATE-KEY &PrivateKey]
}

--  KEY-TRANSPORT
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a key transport algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the key transport algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters

--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &PublicKeySet - specifies which public keys are used with
--                       this algorithm
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  kta-rsaTransport KEY-TRANSPORT ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER &id
--      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
--      PUBLIC-KEYS  { pk-rsa | pk-rsa-pss }
--  }

KEY-TRANSPORT ::= CLASS {
    &id                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params             OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence      ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &PublicKeySet       PUBLIC-KEY OPTIONAL,
    &smimeCaps          SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [PUBLIC-KEYS &PublicKeySet]
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

--  KEY-AGREE
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a key agreement algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the key agreement algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &PublicKeySet - specifies which public keys are used with
--                        this algorithm
--  &Ukm - type of user keying material used
--  &ukmPresence - specifies the requirements to define the UKM field
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  kaa-dh-static-ephemeral KEY-AGREE ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER id-alg-ESDH
--      PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
--      PUBLIC-KEYS {
--         {IDENTIFIER dh-public-number KEY DHPublicKey
--            PARAMS TYPE DHDomainParameters ARE inheritable }

--      }
--      - - UKM should be present but is not separately ASN.1-encoded
--      UKM ARE preferredPresent
--  }

KEY-AGREE ::= CLASS {
    &id             OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params         OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence  ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &PublicKeySet   PUBLIC-KEY OPTIONAL,
    &Ukm            OPTIONAL,
    &ukmPresence    ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &smimeCaps      SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [PUBLIC-KEYS &PublicKeySet]
    [UKM [TYPE &Ukm] ARE &ukmPresence]
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

--  KEY-WRAP
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a key wrap algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the key wrap algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  kwa-cms3DESwrap KEY-WRAP ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER id-alg-CMS3DESwrap
--      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
--  }

KEY-WRAP ::= CLASS {
    &id                OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params            OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence     ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &smimeCaps         SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

--  KEY-DERIVATION
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a key derivation algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the key derivation algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  kda-pbkdf2 KEY-DERIVATION ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER id-PBKDF2
--      PARAMS TYPE PBKDF2-params ARE required
--  }

KEY-DERIVATION ::= CLASS {
    &id                OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params            OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence     ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &smimeCaps         SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

-- MAC-ALGORITHM
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a message
--      authentication code (MAC) algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the MAC algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &keyed - MAC algorithm is a keyed MAC algorithm
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Some parameters that perhaps should have been added would be
--  fields with the minimum and maximum MAC lengths for
--  those MAC algorithms that allow truncations.
--
--  Example:
--  maca-hmac-sha1 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER hMAC-SHA1

--      PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent
--      IS KEYED MAC TRUE
--      SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY hMAC-SHA1}
--  }

MAC-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
    &id                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params             OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence      ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &keyed              BOOLEAN,
    &smimeCaps          SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    IS-KEYED-MAC &keyed
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

--  CONTENT-ENCRYPTION
--
--  Describes the basic properties of a content encryption
--      algorithm
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the content
--        encryption algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  Example:
--  cea-3DES-cbc CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
--      IDENTIFIER des-ede3-cbc
--      PARAMS TYPE IV ARE required
--      SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY des-ede3-cbc }
--  }

CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= CLASS {
    &id                OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params            OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence     ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &smimeCaps         SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

-- ALGORITHM
--
-- Describes a generic algorithm identifier
--
--  &id - contains the OID identifying the algorithm
--  &Params - if present, contains the type for the algorithm
--               parameters; if absent, implies no parameters
--  &paramPresence - parameter presence requirement
--  &smimeCaps - contains the object describing how the S/MIME
--              capabilities are presented.
--
--  This would be used for cases where an algorithm of an unknown
--  type is used.  In general however, one should either define
--  a more complete algorithm structure (such as the one above)
--  or use the TYPE-IDENTIFIER class.

ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
    &id OBJECT   IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Params      OPTIONAL,
    &paramPresence ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
    &smimeCaps   SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    IDENTIFIER &id
    [PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE &paramPresence]
    [SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}

-- AlgorithmIdentifier
--
-- Provides the generic structure that is used to encode algorithm
--    identification and the parameters associated with the
--    algorithm.
--
-- The first parameter represents the type of the algorithm being
--    used.
-- The second parameter represents an object set containing the
--    algorithms that may occur in this situation.
--    The initial list of required algorithms should occur to the
--      left of an extension marker; all other algorithms should
--      occur to the right of an extension marker.
--
-- The object class ALGORITHM can be used for generic unspecified
--     items.
-- If new ALGORITHM classes are defined, the fields &id and &Params
--     need to be present as fields in the object in order to use
--     this parameterized type.
--
-- Example:

--    SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ::=
--       AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgSet}}

AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=
        SEQUENCE {
            algorithm   ALGORITHM-TYPE.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
            parameters  ALGORITHM-TYPE.
                   &Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
        }

--  S/MIME Capabilities
--
--  We have moved the SMIME-CAPS from the module for RFC 3851 to here
--  because it is used in RFC 4262 (X.509 Certificate Extension for
--  S/MIME Capabilities)
--
--
--  This class is used to represent an S/MIME capability.  S/MIME
--  capabilities are used to represent what algorithm capabilities
--  an individual has.  The classic example was the content encryption
--  algorithm RC2 where the algorithm id and the RC2 key lengths
--  supported needed to be advertised, but the IV used is not fixed.
--  Thus, for RC2 we used
--
--  cap-RC2CBC SMIME-CAPS ::= {
--      TYPE INTEGER ( 40 | 128 ) IDENTIFIED BY rc2-cbc }
--
--  where 40 and 128 represent the RC2 key length in number of bits.
--
--  Another example where information needs to be shown is for
--  RSA-OAEP where only specific hash functions or mask generation
--  functions are supported, but the saltLength is specified by the
--  sender and not the recipient.  In this case, one can either
--  generate a number of capability items,
--  or a new S/MIME capability type could be generated where
--  multiple hash functions could be specified.
--
--
--  SMIME-CAP
--
--  This class is used to associate the type that describes the
--  capabilities with the object identifier.
--

SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
    &id         OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Type       OPTIONAL
}

WITH SYNTAX { [TYPE &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }

--
--  Generic type - this is used for defining values.
--

--  Define a single S/MIME capability encoding

SMIMECapability{SMIME-CAPS:CapabilitySet} ::= SEQUENCE {
    capabilityID        SMIME-CAPS.&id({CapabilitySet}),
    parameters          SMIME-CAPS.&Type({CapabilitySet}
                            {@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
}

--  Define a sequence of S/MIME capability values

SMIMECapabilities { SMIME-CAPS:CapabilitySet } ::=
        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SMIMECapability{{CapabilitySet} }

END

4.  ASN.1 Module for RFC 2560

  OCSP-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48)}
  DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
  BEGIN
  IMPORTS

  Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

  AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
  FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

  AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions
  FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

  Name, CertificateSerialNumber, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate
  FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009

      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

  sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2, sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
  FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
      {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
      mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)};

  OCSPRequest     ::=     SEQUENCE {
      tbsRequest                  TBSRequest,
      optionalSignature   [0]     EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

  TBSRequest      ::=     SEQUENCE {
      version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
      requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
      requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
      requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce |
                                  re-ocsp-response, ...}} OPTIONAL }

  Signature       ::=     SEQUENCE {
      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
                               { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
      signature            BIT STRING,
      certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

  Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0) }

  Request ::=     SEQUENCE {
      reqCert                    CertID,
      singleRequestExtensions    [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
                                         { {re-ocsp-service-locator,
                                                ...}} OPTIONAL }

  CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
      hashAlgorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier
                                   {DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
      issuerNameHash     OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN
      issuerKeyHash      OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's public key
      serialNumber       CertificateSerialNumber }

  OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
     responseStatus         OCSPResponseStatus,
     responseBytes          [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

  OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
      successful            (0), --Response has valid confirmations
      malformedRequest      (1), --Illegal confirmation request

      internalError         (2), --Internal error in issuer
      tryLater              (3), --Try again later
                                 -- (4) is not used
      sigRequired           (5), --Must sign the request
      unauthorized          (6)  --Request unauthorized
  }

  RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

  ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= {basicResponse, ...}

  ResponseBytes ::=       SEQUENCE {
      responseType        RESPONSE.
                              &id ({ResponseSet}),
      response            OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
                              &Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}

  basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
      { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }

  BasicOCSPResponse       ::= SEQUENCE {
     tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
     signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                              {sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
                                   sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithMD2, ...}},
     signature            BIT STRING,
     certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }

  ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
     version              [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
     responderID              ResponderID,
     producedAt               GeneralizedTime,
     responses                SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
     responseExtensions   [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
                                  {{re-ocsp-nonce, ...}} OPTIONAL }

  ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
     byName   [1] Name,
     byKey    [2] KeyHash }

  KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
                           -- (excluding the tag and length fields)

  SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
     certID                       CertID,
     certStatus                   CertStatus,
     thisUpdate                   GeneralizedTime,
     nextUpdate           [0]     EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
     singleExtensions     [1]     EXPLICIT Extensions{{re-ocsp-crl |
                                               re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
                                                CrlEntryExtensions, ...}
                                               } OPTIONAL }

  CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
      good                [0]     IMPLICIT NULL,
      revoked             [1]     IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
      unknown             [2]     IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

  RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
      revocationTime              GeneralizedTime,
      revocationReason    [0]     EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

  UnknownInfo ::= NULL

  IMPORTS 
CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
EID 3259 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: 4

Original Text:

CRLReason ::= INTEGER

Corrected Text:

IMPORTS
CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
Notes:
CRLReason is correctly defined in section 14 "ASN.1 Module for RFC 5280, Explicit and Implicit" as:
CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { … }

It is incorrectly re-defined in section 4 "ASN.1 Module for RFC 2560" (OCSP) as an INTEGER. It should import the correct definition instead.
ENUMERATED and INTEGER are similar, but not the same. They are BER-encoded differently (with a tags of 0x0A and 0x02 respectively).
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet}) ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { issuer Name, locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax } CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } -- Request Extensions re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce } re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-response } re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator } -- Response Extensions re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl } re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff } -- Object Identifiers id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 } id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 } id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 } id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 } id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 } id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 } id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 } END 5. ASN.1 Module for RFC 2986 PKCS-10 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} ATTRIBUTE, Name FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}; -- Certificate requests CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1, ... ), subject Name, subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }}, attributes [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }} } SubjectPublicKeyInfo {PUBLIC-KEY: IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {IOSet}}, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } PKInfoAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { ... -- add any locally defined algorithms here -- } Attributes { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SET OF Attribute{{ IOSet }} CRIAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... -- add any locally defined attributes here -- } Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}), values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) } CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, { SignatureAlgorithms }}, signature BIT STRING } SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { ... -- add any locally defined algorithms here -- } END 6. ASN.1 Module for RFC 3279 Note that this module also contains information from RFC 5480 [RFC5480]. PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512 FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54)} ; -- -- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms -- PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { pk-rsa | pk-dsa | pk-dh | pk-kea, ..., pk-ec | pk-ecDH | pk-ecMQV } -- -- Signature Algorithms (sa-) -- SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-rsaWithMD2 | sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 | sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, ..., -- Extensible sa-dsaWithSHA224 | sa-dsaWithSHA256 | sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 | sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 | sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 | sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 } -- -- S/MIME CAPS for algorithms in this document -- -- For all of the algorithms laid out in this document, the -- parameters field for the S/MIME capabilities is defined as -- ABSENT as there are no specific values that need to be known -- by the receiver for negotiation. -- SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= { sa-rsaWithMD2.&smimeCaps | sa-rsaWithMD5.&smimeCaps | sa-rsaWithSHA1.&smimeCaps | sa-dsaWithSHA1.&smimeCaps | sa-dsaWithSHA224.&smimeCaps | sa-dsaWithSHA256.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&smimeCaps | sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&smimeCaps, ... } -- RSA PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption KEY RSAPublicKey PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign} }
EID 6806 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: 6

Original Text:

   pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
    IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
    KEY RSAPublicKey
    PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
    -- Private key format not in this module --
    CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
    keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
   }

Corrected Text:

   pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
    IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
    KEY RSAPublicKey
    PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
    -- Private key format not in this module --
    CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
    keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
   }
Notes:
Section 2.3.1 of RFC 3279 states "(t)he parameters field MUST have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier."
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 } RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { modulus INTEGER, -- n publicExponent INTEGER -- e } -- DSA PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys pk-dsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-dsa KEY DSAPublicKey PARAMS TYPE DSA-Params ARE inheritable -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } id-dsa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 1 } DSA-Params ::= SEQUENCE { p INTEGER, q INTEGER, g INTEGER } DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, y -- Diffie-Hellman PK Algorithm, Parameters, and Keys pk-dh PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER dhpublicnumber KEY DHPublicKey PARAMS TYPE DomainParameters ARE inheritable -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE {keyAgreement, encipherOnly, decipherOnly } } dhpublicnumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 g INTEGER, -- generator, g q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor, j>= 2 validationParams ValidationParams OPTIONAL } ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE { seed BIT STRING, pgenCounter INTEGER } DHPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, y = g^x mod p -- KEA PK Algorithm and Parameters pk-kea PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-keyExchangeAlgorithm -- key is not encoded -- PARAMS TYPE KEA-Params-Id ARE required -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE {keyAgreement, encipherOnly, decipherOnly } } id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 22 } KEA-Params-Id ::= OCTET STRING -- Elliptic Curve (EC) Signatures: Unrestricted Algorithms -- (Section 2.1.1 of RFC 5480) -- -- EC Unrestricted Algorithm ID -- -- this is used for ECDSA pk-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey KEY ECPoint PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyAgreement, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING -- see RFC 5480 for syntax and restrictions id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } -- Elliptic Curve (EC) Signatures: Restricted Algorithms -- (Section 2.1.2 of RFC 5480) -- -- EC Diffie-Hellman Algorithm ID pk-ecDH PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-ecDH KEY ECPoint PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { keyAgreement, encipherOnly, decipherOnly } } id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) ecdh(12) } -- EC Menezes-Qu-Vanstone Algorithm ID pk-ecMQV PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-ecMQV KEY ECPoint PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { keyAgreement, encipherOnly, decipherOnly } } id-ecMQV OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) ecmqv(13) } -- Parameters and Keys for both Restricted and Unrestricted EC ECParameters ::= CHOICE { namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}) -- implicitCurve NULL -- implicitCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedCurve -- specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX -- Details for specifiedCurve can be found in [X9.62] -- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated -- with ANSI X.9. } -- If you need to be able to decode ANSI X.9 parameter structures, -- uncomment the implicitCurve and specifiedCurve above, and also -- uncomment the following: --(WITH COMPONENTS {namedCurve PRESENT}) -- Sec 2.1.1.1 Named Curve CURVE ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE } WITH SYNTAX { ID &id } NamedCurve CURVE ::= { { ID secp192r1 } | { ID sect163k1 } | { ID sect163r2 } | { ID secp224r1 } | { ID sect233k1 } | { ID sect233r1 } | { ID secp256r1 } | { ID sect283k1 } | { ID sect283r1 } | { ID secp384r1 } | { ID sect409k1 } | { ID sect409r1 } | { ID secp521r1 } | { ID sect571k1 } | { ID sect571r1 }, ... -- Extensible } -- Note in [X9.62] the curves are referred to as 'ansiX9' as -- opposed to 'sec'. For example, secp192r1 is the same curve as -- ansix9p192r1. -- Note that in [PKI-ALG] the secp192r1 curve was referred to as -- prime192v1 and the secp256r1 curve was referred to as -- prime256v1. -- Note that [FIPS186-3] refers to secp192r1 as P-192, -- secp224r1 as P-224, secp256r1 as P-256, secp384r1 as P-384, -- and secp521r1 as P-521. secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 } sect163k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 1 } sect163r2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 15 } secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } sect233k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 26 } sect233r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 27 } secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 } sect283k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 16 } sect283r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 17 } secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } sect409k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 36 } sect409r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 37 } secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } sect571k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 38 } sect571r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 39 } -- RSA with MD-2 sa-rsaWithMD2 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER md2WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-md2 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY md2WithRSAEncryption } } md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 2 } -- RSA with MD-5 sa-rsaWithMD5 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER md5WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-md5 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY md5WithRSAEncryption } } md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 4 } -- RSA with SHA-1 sa-rsaWithSHA1 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER sha1WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-sha1 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY sha1WithRSAEncryption } } sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 } -- DSA with SHA-1 sa-dsaWithSHA1 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER dsa-with-sha1 VALUE DSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha1 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-dsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY dsa-with-sha1 } } dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9algorithm(4) 3 } -- DSA with SHA-224 sa-dsaWithSHA224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER dsa-with-sha224 VALUE DSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha224 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-dsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY dsa-with-sha224 } } dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1 } -- DSA with SHA-256 sa-dsaWithSHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER dsa-with-sha256 VALUE DSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-dsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY dsa-with-sha256 } } dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2 } -- ECDSA with SHA-1 sa-ecdsaWithSHA1 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA1 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha1 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA1 } } ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } -- ECDSA with SHA-224 sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA224 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha224 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA224 } } ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } -- ECDSA with SHA-256 sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA256 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA256 } } ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } -- ECDSA with SHA-384 sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA384 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha384 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA384 } } ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } -- ECDSA with SHA-512 sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER ecdsa-with-SHA512 VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent HASHES { mda-sha512 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA512 } } ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } -- -- Signature Values -- -- DSA DSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } -- ECDSA ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } -- -- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-) -- HashAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-md2 | mda-md5 | mda-sha1, ... -- Extensible } -- MD-2 mda-md2 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-md2 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } id-md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } -- MD-5 mda-md5 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-md5 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } id-md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } -- SHA-1 mda-sha1 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-sha1 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 } END 7. ASN.1 Module for RFC 3852 (Attribute Certificate v1)
EID 2649 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: 7,

Original Text:

  AttributeCertificateVersion1-2009
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
      smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-v1AttrCert-02(49) } ;

Corrected Text:

AttributeCertificateVersion1-2009
      { iso(1) member-body(2) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
        mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-v1AttrCert-02(49) } ;
Notes:
Oid was used from the wrong arc. THis change corrects the arc used for the OID number.
AttributeCertificateVersion1-2009 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-v1AttrCert-02(49)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, AlgorithmIdentifier{} FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } CertificateSerialNumber, UniqueIdentifier, SIGNED{} FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } GeneralNames FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) } AttCertValidityPeriod, IssuerSerial FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert-02(47) } ; -- Definition extracted from X.509-1997 [X.509-97], but -- different type names are used to avoid collisions. AttributeCertificateV1 ::= SIGNED{AttributeCertificateInfoV1} AttributeCertificateInfoV1 ::= SEQUENCE { version AttCertVersionV1 DEFAULT v1, subject CHOICE { baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial, -- associated with a Public Key Certificate subjectName [1] GeneralNames }, -- associated with a name issuer GeneralNames, signature AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}}, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, attCertValidityPeriod AttCertValidityPeriod, attributes SEQUENCE OF AttributeSet{{AttrList}}, issuerUniqueID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, extensions Extensions{{AttributeCertExtensionsV1}} OPTIONAL } AttCertVersionV1 ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } AttrList ATTRIBUTE ::= {...} AttributeCertExtensionsV1 EXTENSION ::= {...} END 8. ASN.1 Module for RFC 4055 PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AlgorithmIdentifier{}, ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-TRANSPORT, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY, SMIME-CAPS FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} id-sha1, mda-sha1, pk-rsa, RSAPublicKey FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}; -- ============================ -- Object Set exports -- ============================ -- -- Define top-level symbols with all of the objects defined for -- export to other modules. These objects would be included as part -- of an Object Set to restrict the set of legal values. -- PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= { pk-rsaSSA-PSS | pk-rsaES-OAEP, ... } SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-rsaSSA-PSS, ...} KeyTransportAlgs KEY-TRANSPORT ::= { kta-rsaES-OAEP, ... } HashAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-sha224 | mda-sha256 | mda-sha384 | mda-sha512, ... } SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= { sa-rsaSSA-PSS.&smimeCaps | kta-rsaES-OAEP.&smimeCaps, ... } -- ============================= -- Algorithm Objects -- ============================= -- -- Public key object for PSS signatures -- pk-rsaSSA-PSS PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS KEY RSAPublicKey PARAMS TYPE RSASSA-PSS-params ARE optional -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign } } -- -- Signature algorithm definition for PSS signatures -- sa-rsaSSA-PSS SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS PARAMS TYPE RSASSA-PSS-params ARE required HASHES { mda-sha1 | mda-sha224 | mda-sha256 | mda-sha384 | mda-sha512 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS } } -- -- Signature algorithm definitions for PKCS v1.5 signatures -- sa-sha224WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER sha224WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-sha224 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha224WithRSAEncryption } } sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 14 } sa-sha256WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-sha256 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha256WithRSAEncryption } } sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 } sa-sha384WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER sha384WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-sha384 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha384WithRSAEncryption } } sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 } sa-sha512WithRSAEncryption SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER sha512WithRSAEncryption PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-sha512 } PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa } SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY sha512WithRSAEncryption } } sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 } -- -- Public key definition for OAEP encryption -- pk-rsaES-OAEP PUBLIC-KEY ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSAES-OAEP KEY RSAPublicKey PARAMS TYPE RSAES-OAEP-params ARE optional -- Private key format not in this module -- CERT-KEY-USAGE {keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment} } -- -- Key transport key lock definition for OAEP encryption -- kta-rsaES-OAEP KEY-TRANSPORT ::= { IDENTIFIER id-RSAES-OAEP PARAMS TYPE RSAES-OAEP-params ARE required PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaES-OAEP } SMIME-CAPS { TYPE RSAES-OAEP-params IDENTIFIED BY id-RSAES-OAEP} } -- ============================ -- Basic object identifiers -- ============================ pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } -- When rsaEncryption is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the -- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL. -- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } -- When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, -- and the parameters field is present, it MUST be -- RSAES-OAEP-params. id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 } -- When id-mgf1 is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters -- MUST be present and MUST be a HashAlgorithm. id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 } -- When id-pSpecified is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the -- parameters MUST be an OCTET STRING. id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 } -- When id-RSASSA-PSS is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, and the -- parameters field is present, it MUST be RSASSA-PSS-params. id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 } -- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the -- parameters SHOULD be absent, but if the parameters are present, -- they MUST be NULL. -- -- id-sha1 is imported from RFC 3279. Additionally, the v1.5 -- signature algorithms (i.e., rsaWithSHA256) are now solely placed -- in that module. -- id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } mda-sha224 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-sha224 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } mda-sha256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-sha256 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } mda-sha384 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-sha384 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } mda-sha512 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-sha512 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent } -- ============= -- Constants -- ============= EncodingParameters ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(0..MAX)) nullOctetString EncodingParameters ::= ''H nullParameters NULL ::= NULL -- ========================= -- Algorithm Identifiers -- ========================= HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {HashAlgorithms}} HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { { IDENTIFIER id-sha1 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent } | { IDENTIFIER id-sha224 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent } | { IDENTIFIER id-sha256 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent } | { IDENTIFIER id-sha384 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent } | { IDENTIFIER id-sha512 PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent } } sha1Identifier HashAlgorithm ::= { algorithm id-sha1, parameters NULL : NULL } -- -- We have a default algorithm - create the value here -- MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {PKCS1MGFAlgorithms}} mgf1SHA1 MaskGenAlgorithm ::= { algorithm id-mgf1, parameters HashAlgorithm : sha1Identifier } -- -- Define the set of mask generation functions -- -- If the identifier is id-mgf1, any of the listed hash -- algorithms may be used. -- PKCS1MGFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { { IDENTIFIER id-mgf1 PARAMS TYPE HashAlgorithm ARE required }, ... } -- -- Define the set of known source algorithms for PSS -- PSourceAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {PSS-SourceAlgorithms}} PSS-SourceAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { { IDENTIFIER id-pSpecified PARAMS TYPE EncodingParameters ARE required }, ... } pSpecifiedEmpty PSourceAlgorithm ::= { algorithm id-pSpecified, parameters EncodingParameters : nullOctetString } -- =================== -- Main structures -- =================== -- AlgorithmIdentifier parameters for id-RSASSA-PSS. -- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit. -- Note: The hash algorithm in hashAlgorithm and in -- maskGenAlgorithm should be the same. RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1Identifier, maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1, saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20, trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 } -- AlgorithmIdentifier parameters for id-RSAES-OAEP. -- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit. -- Note: The hash algorithm in hashFunc and in -- maskGenFunc should be the same. RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE { hashFunc [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1Identifier, maskGenFunc [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1, pSourceFunc [2] PSourceAlgorithm DEFAULT pSpecifiedEmpty } END 9. ASN.1 Module for RFC 4210 PKIXCMP-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2000-02(50) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} Certificate, CertificateList FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} GeneralName, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedValue, CertId, CertReqMessages FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) } -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Appendix C of this specification CertificationRequest FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)} -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module ; -- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and -- constructs CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... } -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509 -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol, -- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the -- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to -- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by -- this change.) -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { header PKIHeader, body PKIBody, protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) }, sender GeneralName, -- identifies the sender recipient GeneralName, -- identifies the intended recipient messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, -- time of production of this message (used when sender -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- to identify specific keys used for protection transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf -- messages senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by -- the intended recipient of this message freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- (this field is intended for human consumption) generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL -- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) } PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag -- to indicate the language of the contained text; -- see [RFC2482] for details) PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10] popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann. cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann. rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann. crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response } PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { header PKIHeader, body PKIBody } id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { salt OCTET STRING, -- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) iterationCount INTEGER, -- number of times the OWF is applied -- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 } DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}} -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202]) } PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { accepted (0), -- you got exactly what you asked for grantedWithMods (1), -- you got something like what you asked for; the -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences rejection (2), -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message waiting (3), -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard) revocationWarning (4), -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is -- imminent revocationNotification (5), -- notification that a revocation has occurred keyUpdateWarning (6) -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in -- CertReqMsg } PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { -- since we can fail in more than one way! -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. badAlg (0), -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier badMessageCheck (1), -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) badRequest (2), -- transaction not permitted or supported badTime (3), -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, -- as defined by local policy badCertId (4), -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria badDataFormat (5), -- the data submitted has the wrong format wrongAuthority (6), -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the -- one creating the response token incorrectData (7), -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) missingTimeStamp (8), -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there -- (by policy) badPOP (9), -- the proof-of-possession failed certRevoked (10), -- the certificate has already been revoked certConfirmed (11), -- the certificate has already been confirmed wrongIntegrity (12), -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or -- vice versa badRecipientNonce (13), -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value timeNotAvailable (14), -- the TSA's time source is not available unacceptedPolicy (15), -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA unacceptedExtension (16), -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA addInfoNotAvailable (17), -- the additional information requested could not be -- understood or is not available badSenderNonce (18), -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size badCertTemplate (19), -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information signerNotTrusted (20), -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted transactionIdInUse (21), -- the transaction identifier is already in use unsupportedVersion (22), -- the version of the message is not supported notAuthorized (23), -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding -- request or perform the preceding action systemUnavail (24), -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability systemFailure (25), -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure duplicateCertReq (26) -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate -- certificate already exists } PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL } OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, hashVal BIT STRING -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID. } POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding -- Challenge is to be used). witness OCTET STRING, -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.] challenge OCTET STRING -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as -- Rand ::= SEQUENCE { -- int INTEGER, -- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) -- sender GeneralName -- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) -- } } POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- corresponding Challenge. CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- corresponding request) status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, privateKey [0] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL, -- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { certificate [0] CMPCertificate, encryptedCert [1] EncryptedValue } KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatusInfo, newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL } RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { certDetails CertTemplate, -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about -- the cert. for which revocation is requested -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL -- requested crlEntryExtensions } RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo, -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, -- IDs for which revocation was requested -- (same order as status) crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) } CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv } CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, certId CertId, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) } CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &id({SupportedInfoSet}), infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... } -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- appropriate for a given environment): -- -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedValue -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- -- -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for -- specific environments. GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above. -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set -- indicates that the CA may send -- any/all information that it wishes. GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not -- recognize. ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- implementation-specific error codes errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL -- implementation-specific error details } CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL } PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER } PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } END 10. ASN.1 Module for RFC 4211 PKIXCRMF-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE, SingleAttribute{} FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} Version, Name, Time, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, UniqueIdentifier, id-pkix, SignatureAlgorithms FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} GeneralName, CertExtensions FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} EnvelopedData, CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)} maca-hMAC-SHA1 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) } mda-sha1 FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ; -- arc for Internet X.509 PKI protocols and their components id-pkip OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 5 } id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 } id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 } -- content types -- Core definitions for this module CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE { certReq CertRequest, popo ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL, -- content depends upon key type regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF SingleAttribute{{RegInfoSet}} OPTIONAL } CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued controls Controls OPTIONAL } -- Attributes affecting issuance CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] Version OPTIONAL, serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL, issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL, validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, subject [5] Name OPTIONAL, publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, extensions [9] Extensions{{CertExtensions}} OPTIONAL } OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE { notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL, notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL } -- at least one MUST be present Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF SingleAttribute {{RegControlSet}} ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE { raVerified [0] NULL, -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in -- possession of the private key signature [1] POPOSigningKey, keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey, keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey } POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL, algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, signature BIT STRING } -- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the -- DER-encoded value of poposkInput. NOTE: If the CertReqMsg -- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values, -- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be -- computed over the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq. If -- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain both the -- public key and subject values (i.e., if it contains only one -- of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present and -- MUST be signed. POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { authInfo CHOICE { sender [0] GeneralName, -- used only if an authenticated identity has been -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate) publicKeyMAC PKMACValue }, -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo } -- from CertTemplate PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE { algId AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {Password-MACAlgorithms}}, value BIT STRING } -- -- Define the currently only acceptable MAC algorithm to be used -- for the PKMACValue structure -- id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } Password-MACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { {IDENTIFIER id-PasswordBasedMac PARAMS TYPE PBMParameter ARE required IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE }, ... } PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { salt OCTET STRING, owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {DigestAlgorithms}}, -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) iterationCount INTEGER, -- number of times the OWF is applied mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {MACAlgorithms}} -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC, or HMAC } DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-sha1, ... } MACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= { -- The modules containing the ASN.1 for the DES and 3DES MAC -- algorithms have not been updated at the time that this is -- being published. Users of this module should define the -- appropriate MAC-ALGORITHM objects and uncomment the -- following lines if they support these MAC algorithms. -- maca-des-mac | maca-3des-mac -- maca-hMAC-SHA1, ... } POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated -- possession is proven in this message (which contains -- the private key itself (encrypted for the CA)) subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue, encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData } -- for keyAgreement (only), possession is proven in this message -- (which contains a MAC (over the DER-encoded value of the -- certReq parameter in CertReqMsg, which MUST include both -- subject and publicKey) based on a key derived from the end -- entity's private DH key and the CA's public DH key); SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER { encrCert (0), -- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the -- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a -- confirmation message) challengeResp (1) } -- requests that CA engage in challenge-response exchange with -- end entity in order to prove private key possession -- -- id-ct-encKeyWithID content type used as the content type for the -- EnvelopedData in POPOPrivKey. -- It contains both a private key and an identifier for key escrow -- agents to check against recovery requestors. -- ct-encKeyWithID CONTENT-TYPE ::= { EncKeyWithID IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-encKeyWithID } id-ct-encKeyWithID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ct 21} EncKeyWithID ::= SEQUENCE { privateKey PrivateKeyInfo, identifier CHOICE { string UTF8String, generalName GeneralName } OPTIONAL } PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER, privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}, privateKey OCTET STRING, -- Structure of public key is in PUBLIC-KEY.&PrivateKey attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } Attributes ::= SET OF AttributeSet{{PrivateKeyAttributes}} PrivateKeyAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {...} -- -- 6. Registration Controls in CRMF -- id-regCtrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 1 } RegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { regCtrl-regToken | regCtrl-authenticator | regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo | regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions | regCtrl-oldCertID | regCtrl-protocolEncrKey, ... } -- -- 6.1. Registration Token Control -- regCtrl-regToken ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE RegToken IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-regToken } id-regCtrl-regToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 1 } RegToken ::= UTF8String -- -- 6.2. Authenticator Control -- regCtrl-authenticator ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE Authenticator IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-authenticator } id-regCtrl-authenticator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 2 } Authenticator ::= UTF8String -- -- 6.3. Publication Information Control -- regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE PKIPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo } id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 3 } PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { action INTEGER { dontPublish (0), pleasePublish (1) }, pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL } -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish" -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted, -- "dontCare" is assumed) SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE { pubMethod INTEGER { dontCare (0), x500 (1), web (2), ldap (3) }, pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL } -- -- 6.4. Archive Options Control -- regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE PKIArchiveOptions IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions } id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 4 } PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey, -- the actual value of the private key keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, -- parameters that allow the private key to be re-generated archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN } -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private -- key of a key pair that the receiver generates in response to -- this request; set to FALSE if no archive is desired. EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- Deprecated envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. -- -- We skipped doing the full constraints here since this structure -- has been deprecated in favor of EnvelopedData -- EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL, -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL, -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only -- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity -- in the future) encValue BIT STRING } -- the encrypted value itself -- When EncryptedValue is used to carry a private key (as opposed to -- a certificate), implementations MUST support the encValue field -- containing an encrypted PrivateKeyInfo as defined in [PKCS11], -- section 12.11. If encValue contains some other format/encoding -- for the private key, the first octet of valueHint MAY be used -- to indicate the format/encoding (but note that the possible values -- of this octet are not specified at this time). In all cases, the -- intendedAlg field MUST be used to indicate at least the OID of -- the intended algorithm of the private key, unless this information -- is known a priori to both sender and receiver by some other means. KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING -- -- 6.5. OldCert ID Control -- regCtrl-oldCertID ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE OldCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-oldCertID } id-regCtrl-oldCertID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 5 } OldCertId ::= CertId CertId ::= SEQUENCE { issuer GeneralName, serialNumber INTEGER } -- -- 6.6. Protocol Encryption Key Control -- regCtrl-protocolEncrKey ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE ProtocolEncrKey IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey } id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 6 } ProtocolEncrKey ::= SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- -- 7. Registration Info in CRMF -- id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 2 } RegInfoSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { regInfo-utf8Pairs | regInfo-certReq } -- -- 7.1. utf8Pairs RegInfo Control -- regInfo-utf8Pairs ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE UTF8Pairs IDENTIFIED BY id-regInfo-utf8Pairs } id-regInfo-utf8Pairs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 1 } --with syntax UTF8Pairs ::= UTF8String -- -- 7.2. certReq RegInfo Control -- regInfo-certReq ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE CertReq IDENTIFIED BY id-regInfo-certReq } id-regInfo-certReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 2 } --with syntax CertReq ::= CertRequest END 11. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5055 SCVP-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-scvp-02(52) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY, KEY-AGREE, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-DERIVATION, MAC-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} Certificate, CertificateList, CertificateSerialNumber, SignatureAlgorithms, SubjectPublicKeyInfo FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyUsage, KeyPurposeId FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) } AttributeCertificate FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert-02(47) } OCSPResponse FROM OCSP-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) } ContentInfo, CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) } mda-sha1 FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ; ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= {ct-scvp-certValRequest | ct-scvp-certValResponse | ct-scvp-valPolRequest | ct-scvp-valPolResponse, ... } id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) id-smime(16) 1 } ct-scvp-certValRequest CONTENT-TYPE ::= { CVRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-scvp-certValRequest } id-ct-scvp-certValRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 10 } -- SCVP Certificate Validation Request CVRequest ::= SEQUENCE { cvRequestVersion INTEGER DEFAULT 1, query Query, requestorRef [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, requestNonce [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, requestorName [2] GeneralName OPTIONAL, responderName [3] GeneralName OPTIONAL, requestExtensions [4] Extensions{{RequestExtensions}} OPTIONAL, signatureAlg [5] AlgorithmIdentifier {SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}} OPTIONAL, hashAlg [6] OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, requestorText [7] UTF8String (SIZE (1..256)) OPTIONAL } -- Set of signature algorithms is coming from RFC 5280 -- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {...} -- Add supported request extensions here; all new items should -- be added after the extension marker RequestExtensions EXTENSION ::= {...} Query ::= SEQUENCE { queriedCerts CertReferences, checks CertChecks, wantBack [1] WantBack OPTIONAL, validationPolicy ValidationPolicy, responseFlags ResponseFlags OPTIONAL, serverContextInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, validationTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, intermediateCerts [4] CertBundle OPTIONAL, revInfos [5] RevocationInfos OPTIONAL, producedAt [6] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, queryExtensions [7] Extensions{{QueryExtensions}} OPTIONAL } -- Add supported query extensions here; all new items should be added -- after the extension marker QueryExtensions EXTENSION ::= {...} CertReferences ::= CHOICE { pkcRefs [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference, acRefs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ACReference } CertReference::= CHOICE { pkc PKCReference, ac ACReference } PKCReference ::= CHOICE { cert [0] Certificate, pkcRef [1] SCVPCertID } ACReference ::= CHOICE { attrCert [2] AttributeCertificate, acRef [3] SCVPCertID } HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {mda-sha1, ...}} SCVPCertID ::= SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING, issuerSerial SCVPIssuerSerial, hashAlgorithm HashAlgorithm DEFAULT { algorithm mda-sha1.&id } } SCVPIssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE { issuer GeneralNames, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } ValidationPolicy ::= SEQUENCE { validationPolRef ValidationPolRef, validationAlg [0] ValidationAlg OPTIONAL, userPolicySet [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, inhibitPolicyMapping [2] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, requireExplicitPolicy [3] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, inhibitAnyPolicy [4] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, trustAnchors [5] TrustAnchors OPTIONAL, keyUsages [6] SEQUENCE OF KeyUsage OPTIONAL, extendedKeyUsages [7] SEQUENCE OF KeyPurposeId OPTIONAL, specifiedKeyUsages [8] SEQUENCE OF KeyPurposeId OPTIONAL } CertChecks ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER (CertCheckSet | ACertCheckSet, ... ) WantBack ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF WANT-BACK.&id ({AllWantBacks}) POLICY ::= ATTRIBUTE ValidationPolRefSet POLICY ::= { svp-defaultValPolicy, ... } ValidationPolRef ::= SEQUENCE { valPolId POLICY.&id, valPolParams POLICY.&Type OPTIONAL } ValidationAlgSet POLICY ::= { svp-basicValAlg, ... } ValidationAlg ::= SEQUENCE { valAlgId POLICY.&id, parameters POLICY.&Type OPTIONAL } NameValidationAlgSet POLICY ::= { svp-nameValAlg, ... } NameValidationAlgParams ::= SEQUENCE { nameCompAlgId OBJECT IDENTIFIER (NameCompAlgSet, ... ), validationNames GeneralNames } TrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKCReference KeyAgreePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-AGREE, {SupportedKeyAgreePublicKeys}}, publicKey BIT STRING, macAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {SupportedMACAlgorithms}}, kDF AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION, {SupportedKeyDerivationFunctions}} OPTIONAL } SupportedKeyAgreePublicKeys KEY-AGREE ::= {...} SupportedMACAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {...} SupportedKeyDerivationFunctions KEY-DERIVATION ::= {...} ResponseFlags ::= SEQUENCE { fullRequestInResponse [0] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, responseValidationPolByRef [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE, protectResponse [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE, cachedResponse [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE } CertBundle ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate RevocationInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF RevocationInfo RevocationInfo ::= CHOICE { crl [0] CertificateList, delta-crl [1] CertificateList, ocsp [2] OCSPResponse, other [3] OtherRevInfo } REV-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER OtherRevInfo ::= SEQUENCE { riType REV-INFO.&id, riValue REV-INFO.&Type } -- SCVP Certificate Validation Response ct-scvp-certValResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::= { CVResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-scvp-certValResponse } id-ct-scvp-certValResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 11 } CVResponse ::= SEQUENCE { cvResponseVersion INTEGER, serverConfigurationID INTEGER, producedAt GeneralizedTime, responseStatus ResponseStatus, respValidationPolicy [0] RespValidationPolicy OPTIONAL, requestRef [1] RequestReference OPTIONAL, requestorRef [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, requestorName [3] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, replyObjects [4] ReplyObjects OPTIONAL, respNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, serverContextInfo [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, cvResponseExtensions [7] Extensions{{CVResponseExtensions}} OPTIONAL, requestorText [8] UTF8String (SIZE (1..256)) OPTIONAL } -- This document defines no extensions CVResponseExtensions EXTENSION ::= {...} ResponseStatus ::= SEQUENCE { statusCode CVStatusCode DEFAULT okay, errorMessage UTF8String OPTIONAL } CVStatusCode ::= ENUMERATED { okay (0), skipUnrecognizedItems (1), tooBusy (10), invalidRequest (11), internalError (12), badStructure (20), unsupportedVersion (21), abortUnrecognizedItems (22), unrecognizedSigKey (23), badSignatureOrMAC (24), unableToDecode (25), notAuthorized (26), unsupportedChecks (27), unsupportedWantBacks (28), unsupportedSignatureOrMAC (29), invalidSignatureOrMAC (30), protectedResponseUnsupported (31), unrecognizedResponderName (32), relayingLoop (40), unrecognizedValPol (50), unrecognizedValAlg (51), fullRequestInResponseUnsupported (52), fullPolResponseUnsupported (53), inhibitPolicyMappingUnsupported (54), requireExplicitPolicyUnsupported (55), inhibitAnyPolicyUnsupported (56), validationTimeUnsupported (57), unrecognizedCritQueryExt (63), unrecognizedCritRequestExt (64), ... } RespValidationPolicy ::= ValidationPolicy RequestReference ::= CHOICE { requestHash [0] HashValue, -- hash of CVRequest fullRequest [1] CVRequest } HashValue ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm HashAlgorithm DEFAULT { algorithm mda-sha1.&id }, value OCTET STRING } ReplyObjects ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReply CertReply ::= SEQUENCE { cert CertReference, replyStatus ReplyStatus DEFAULT success, replyValTime GeneralizedTime, replyChecks ReplyChecks, replyWantBacks ReplyWantBacks, validationErrors [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( BasicValidationErrorSet | NameValidationErrorSet, ... ) OPTIONAL, nextUpdate [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, certReplyExtensions [2] Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL } ReplyStatus ::= ENUMERATED { success (0), malformedPKC (1), malformedAC (2), unavailableValidationTime (3), referenceCertHashFail (4), certPathConstructFail (5), certPathNotValid (6), certPathNotValidNow (7), wantBackUnsatisfied (8) } ReplyChecks ::= SEQUENCE OF ReplyCheck ReplyCheck ::= SEQUENCE { check OBJECT IDENTIFIER (CertCheckSet | ACertCheckSet, ... ), status INTEGER DEFAULT 0 } ReplyWantBacks ::= SEQUENCE OF ReplyWantBack ReplyWantBack::= SEQUENCE { wb WANT-BACK.&id({AllWantBacks}), value OCTET STRING (CONTAINING WANT-BACK.&Type({AllWantBacks}{@wb})) } WANT-BACK ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER AllWantBacks WANT-BACK ::= { WantBackSet | ACertWantBackSet | AnyWantBackSet, ... } CertBundles ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertBundle RevInfoWantBack ::= SEQUENCE { revocationInfo RevocationInfos, extraCerts CertBundle OPTIONAL } SCVPResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF ContentInfo -- SCVP Validation Policies Request ct-scvp-valPolRequest CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ValPolRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-scvp-valPolRequest } id-ct-scvp-valPolRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 12 } ValPolRequest ::= SEQUENCE { vpRequestVersion INTEGER DEFAULT 1, requestNonce OCTET STRING } -- SCVP Validation Policies Response ct-scvp-valPolResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ValPolResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-scvp-valPolResponse } id-ct-scvp-valPolResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 13 } ValPolResponse ::= SEQUENCE { vpResponseVersion INTEGER, maxCVRequestVersion INTEGER, maxVPRequestVersion INTEGER, serverConfigurationID INTEGER, thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, supportedChecks CertChecks, supportedWantBacks WantBack, validationPolicies SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, validationAlgs SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, authPolicies SEQUENCE OF AuthPolicy, responseTypes ResponseTypes, defaultPolicyValues RespValidationPolicy, revocationInfoTypes RevocationInfoTypes, signatureGeneration SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier {SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, signatureVerification SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier {SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, hashAlgorithms SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, serverPublicKeys SEQUENCE OF KeyAgreePublicKey OPTIONAL, clockSkew INTEGER DEFAULT 10, requestNonce OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } ResponseTypes ::= ENUMERATED { cached-only (0), non-cached-only (1), cached-and-non-cached (2) } RevocationInfoTypes ::= BIT STRING { fullCRLs (0), deltaCRLs (1), indirectCRLs (2), oCSPResponses (3) } AuthPolicy ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- SCVP Check Identifiers id-stc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 17 } CertCheckSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc-build-pkc-path | id-stc-build-valid-pkc-path | id-stc-build-status-checked-pkc-path, ... } id-stc-build-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 1 } id-stc-build-valid-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 2 } id-stc-build-status-checked-pkc-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 3 } ACertCheckSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc-build-aa-path | id-stc-build-valid-aa-path | id-stc-build-status-checked-aa-path | id-stc-status-check-ac-and-build-status-checked-aa-path } id-stc-build-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 4 } id-stc-build-valid-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 5 } id-stc-build-status-checked-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 6 } id-stc-status-check-ac-and-build-status-checked-aa-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-stc 7 } -- SCVP WantBack Identifiers id-swb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 18 } WantBackSet WANT-BACK ::= { swb-pkc-cert | swb-pkc-best-cert-path | swb-pkc-revocation-info | swb-pkc-public-key-info | swb-pkc-all-cert-paths | swb-pkc-ee-revocation-info | swb-pkc-CAs-revocation-info } ACertWantBackSet WANT-BACK ::= { swb-ac-cert | swb-aa-cert-path | swb-aa-revocation-info | swb-ac-revocation-info } AnyWantBackSet WANT-BACK ::= { swb-relayed-responses } swb-pkc-best-cert-path WANT-BACK ::= { CertBundle IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-best-cert-path } id-swb-pkc-best-cert-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 1 } swb-pkc-revocation-info WANT-BACK ::= { RevInfoWantBack IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-revocation-info } id-swb-pkc-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 2 } swb-pkc-public-key-info WANT-BACK ::= { SubjectPublicKeyInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-public-key-info } id-swb-pkc-public-key-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 4 } swb-aa-cert-path WANT-BACK ::= {CertBundle IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-aa-cert-path } id-swb-aa-cert-path OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 5 } swb-aa-revocation-info WANT-BACK ::= { RevInfoWantBack IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-aa-revocation-info } id-swb-aa-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 6 } swb-ac-revocation-info WANT-BACK ::= { RevInfoWantBack IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-ac-revocation-info } id-swb-ac-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 7 } swb-relayed-responses WANT-BACK ::= {SCVPResponses IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-relayed-responses } id-swb-relayed-responses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 9 } swb-pkc-all-cert-paths WANT-BACK ::= {CertBundles IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths } id-swb-pkc-all-cert-paths OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 12} swb-pkc-ee-revocation-info WANT-BACK ::= { RevInfoWantBack IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-ee-revocation-info } id-swb-pkc-ee-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 13} swb-pkc-CAs-revocation-info WANT-BACK ::= { RevInfoWantBack IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-CAs-revocation-info } id-swb-pkc-CAs-revocation-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 14} swb-pkc-cert WANT-BACK ::= { Certificate IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-pkc-cert } id-swb-pkc-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 10} swb-ac-cert WANT-BACK ::= { AttributeCertificate IDENTIFIED BY id-swb-ac-cert } id-swb-ac-cert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-swb 11} -- SCVP Validation Policy and Algorithm Identifiers id-svp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 19 } svp-defaultValPolicy POLICY ::= { IDENTIFIED BY id-svp-defaultValPolicy } id-svp-defaultValPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 1 } -- SCVP Basic Validation Algorithm Identifier svp-basicValAlg POLICY ::= {IDENTIFIED BY id-svp-basicValAlg } id-svp-basicValAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 3 } -- SCVP Basic Validation Algorithm Errors id-bvae OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-svp-basicValAlg BasicValidationErrorSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae-expired | id-bvae-not-yet-valid | id-bvae-wrongTrustAnchor | id-bvae-noValidCertPath | id-bvae-revoked | id-bvae-invalidKeyPurpose | id-bvae-invalidKeyUsage | id-bvae-invalidCertPolicy } id-bvae-expired OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 1 } id-bvae-not-yet-valid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 2 } id-bvae-wrongTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 3 } id-bvae-noValidCertPath OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 4 } id-bvae-revoked OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 5 } id-bvae-invalidKeyPurpose OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 9 } id-bvae-invalidKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 10 } id-bvae-invalidCertPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-bvae 11 } -- SCVP Name Validation Algorithm Identifier svp-nameValAlg POLICY ::= {TYPE NameValidationAlgParams IDENTIFIED BY id-svp-nameValAlg } id-svp-nameValAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 2 } -- SCVP Name Validation Algorithm DN comparison algorithm NameCompAlgSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nva-dnCompAlg } id-nva-dnCompAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-svp 4 } -- SCVP Name Validation Algorithm Errors id-nvae OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-svp-nameValAlg NameValidationErrorSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae-name-mismatch | id-nvae-no-name | id-nvae-unknown-alg | id-nvae-bad-name | id-nvae-bad-name-type | id-nvae-mixed-names } id-nvae-name-mismatch OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 1 } id-nvae-no-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 2 } id-nvae-unknown-alg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 3 } id-nvae-bad-name OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 4 } id-nvae-bad-name-type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 5 } id-nvae-mixed-names OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-nvae 6 } -- SCVP Extended Key Usage Key Purpose Identifiers id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3 } SvcpExtKeyUsageSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp-scvpServer | id-kp-scvpClient } id-kp-scvpServer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 15 } id-kp-scvpClient OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 16 } END 12. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5272 EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmc2002-02(53)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN EXPORTS ALL; IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, Extension{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-WRAP, KEY-DERIVATION, MAC-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags, CertExtensions FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} Name, id-pkix, PublicKeyAlgorithms, SignatureAlgorithms FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber, CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)} CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)} mda-sha1 FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)} kda-PBKDF2, maca-hMAC-SHA1 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) } mda-sha256 FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ; -- CMS Content types defined in this document CMC-ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-PKIData | ct-PKIResponse, ... } -- Signature Algorithms defined in this document SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-noSignature } -- CMS Unsigned Attributes CMC-UnsignedAtts ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-cmc-unsignedData } -- -- id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7} -- CMC controls id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12} -- CMC content types -- This is the content type for a request message in the protocol ct-PKIData CONTENT-TYPE ::= { PKIData IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIData } id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 } PKIData ::= SEQUENCE { controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute, reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest, cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo, otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg } BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295) TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, attrType CMC-CONTROL.&id({Cmc-Control-Set}), attrValues SET OF CMC-CONTROL. &Type({Cmc-Control-Set}{@attrType}) } Cmc-Control-Set CMC-CONTROL ::= { cmc-identityProof | cmc-dataReturn | cmc-regInfo | cmc-responseInfo | cmc-queryPending | cmc-popLinkRandom | cmc-popLinkWitness | cmc-identification | cmc-transactionId | cmc-senderNonce | cmc-recipientNonce | cmc-statusInfo | cmc-addExtensions | cmc-encryptedPOP | cmc-decryptedPOP | cmc-lraPOPWitness | cmc-getCert | cmc-getCRL | cmc-revokeRequest | cmc-confirmCertAcceptance | cmc-statusInfoV2 | cmc-trustedAnchors | cmc-authData | cmc-batchRequests | cmc-batchResponses | cmc-publishCert | cmc-modCertTemplate | cmc-controlProcessed | cmc-identityProofV2 | cmc-popLinkWitnessV2, ... } OTHER-REQUEST ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER -- We do not define any other requests in this document; -- examples might be attribute certification requests OtherRequests OTHER-REQUEST ::= {...} TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE { tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest, crm [1] CertReqMsg, orm [2] SEQUENCE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, requestMessageType OTHER-REQUEST.&id({OtherRequests}), requestMessageValue OTHER-REQUEST.&Type({OtherRequests} {@.requestMessageType}) } } TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, certificationRequest CertificationRequest } AttributeList ATTRIBUTE ::= {at-extension-req, ...} CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE { version INTEGER, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {PublicKeyAlgorithms}}, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF AttributeSet{{AttributeList}} }, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier {SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, signature BIT STRING } TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, contentInfo ContentInfo } OTHER-MSG ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER -- No other messages currently defined OtherMsgSet OTHER-MSG ::= {...} OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, otherMsgType OTHER-MSG.&id({OtherMsgSet}), otherMsgValue OTHER-MSG.&Type({OtherMsgSet}{@otherMsgType}) } -- This defines the response message in the protocol ct-PKIResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::= { PKIResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIResponse } id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 } ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE { controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute, cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo, otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg } CMC-CONTROL ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING cmc-identityProof CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProof } id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3} cmc-dataReturn CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-dataReturn } id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4} cmc-regInfo CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-regInfo } id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18} cmc-responseInfo CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseInfo } id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19} cmc-queryPending CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-queryPending } id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21} cmc-popLinkRandom CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkRandom } id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22} cmc-popLinkWitness CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitness } id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23} -- The following controls have the type UTF8String cmc-identification CMC-CONTROL ::= { UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identification } id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2} -- The following controls have the type INTEGER cmc-transactionId CMC-CONTROL ::= { INTEGER IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-transactionId } id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5} -- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING cmc-senderNonce CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-senderNonce } id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6} cmc-recipientNonce CMC-CONTROL ::= { OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-recipientNonce } id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7} -- Used to return status in a response cmc-statusInfo CMC-CONTROL ::= { CMCStatusInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfo } id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1} CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { cMCStatus CMCStatus, bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID, statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL, otherInfo CHOICE { failInfo CMCFailInfo, pendInfo PendInfo } OPTIONAL } PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE { pendToken OCTET STRING, pendTime GeneralizedTime } CMCStatus ::= INTEGER { success (0), failed (2), pending (3), noSupport (4), confirmRequired (5), popRequired (6), partial (7) } -- Note: -- The spelling of unsupportedExt is corrected in this version. -- In RFC 2797, it was unsuportedExt. CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER { badAlg (0), badMessageCheck (1), badRequest (2), badTime (3), badCertId (4), unsuportedExt (5), mustArchiveKeys (6), badIdentity (7), popRequired (8), popFailed (9), noKeyReuse (10), internalCAError (11), tryLater (12), authDataFail (13) } -- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests cmc-addExtensions CMC-CONTROL ::= { AddExtensions IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-addExtensions } id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8} AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE { pkiDataReference BodyPartID, certReferences SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID, extensions SEQUENCE OF Extension{{CertExtensions}} } cmc-encryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::= { EncryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-encryptedPOP } cmc-decryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::= { DecryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-decryptedPOP } id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9} id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10} EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE { request TaggedRequest, cms ContentInfo, thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}}, witnessAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {WitnessAlgs}}, witness OCTET STRING } POPAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {maca-hMAC-SHA1, ...} WitnessAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {mda-sha1, ...} DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}}, thePOP OCTET STRING } cmc-lraPOPWitness CMC-CONTROL ::= { LraPopWitness IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-lraPOPWitness } id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11} LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE { pkiDataBodyid BodyPartID, bodyIds SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID } -- cmc-getCert CMC-CONTROL ::= { GetCert IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCert } id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15} GetCert ::= SEQUENCE { issuerName GeneralName, serialNumber INTEGER } cmc-getCRL CMC-CONTROL ::= { GetCRL IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCRL } id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16} GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE { issuerName Name, cRLName GeneralName OPTIONAL, time GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, reasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL } cmc-revokeRequest CMC-CONTROL ::= { RevokeRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-revokeRequest} id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17} RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE { issuerName Name, serialNumber INTEGER, reason CRLReason, invalidityDate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, passphrase OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, comment UTF8String OPTIONAL } cmc-confirmCertAcceptance CMC-CONTROL ::= { CMCCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance } id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24} CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber -- The following is used to request v3 extensions be added -- to a certificate at-extension-req ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE ExtensionReq IDENTIFIED BY id-ExtensionReq } id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14} ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension{{CertExtensions}} -- The following allows Diffie-Hellman Certification Request -- Messages to be well-formed sa-noSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { IDENTIFIER id-alg-noSignature VALUE NoSignatureValue PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required HASHES { mda-sha1 } } id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2} NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING -- Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data. id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)} aa-cmc-unsignedData ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE CMCUnsignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-cmc-unsignedData } id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34} CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE { bodyPartPath BodyPartPath, identifier TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id, content TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type } -- Replaces CMC Status Info -- cmc-statusInfoV2 CMC-CONTROL ::= { CMCStatusInfoV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfoV2 } id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25} EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER ExtendedFailures EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= {...} CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE { cMCStatus CMCStatus, bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference, statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL, otherInfo CHOICE { failInfo CMCFailInfo, pendInfo PendInfo, extendedFailInfo [1] SEQUENCE { failInfoOID TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id ({ExtendedFailures}), failInfoValue TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type ({ExtendedFailures} {@.failInfoOID}) } } OPTIONAL } BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE { bodyPartID BodyPartID, bodyPartPath BodyPartPath } BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID -- Allow for distribution of trust anchors -- cmc-trustedAnchors CMC-CONTROL ::= { PublishTrustAnchors IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-trustedAnchors } id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26} PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE { seqNumber INTEGER, hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {HashAlgorithms}}, anchorHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING } HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= { mda-sha1 | mda-sha256, ... } cmc-authData CMC-CONTROL ::= { AuthPublish IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-authData } id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27} AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID -- These two items use BodyPartList cmc-batchRequests CMC-CONTROL ::= { BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchRequests } id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28} cmc-batchResponses CMC-CONTROL ::= { BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchResponses } id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29} BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID cmc-publishCert CMC-CONTROL ::= { CMCPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-publishCert } id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30} CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {HashAlgorithms}}, certHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING, pubInfo PKIPublicationInfo } cmc-modCertTemplate CMC-CONTROL ::= { ModCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-modCertTemplate } id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31} ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { pkiDataReference BodyPartPath, certReferences BodyPartList, replace BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE, certTemplate CertTemplate } -- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have -- already been processed cmc-controlProcessed CMC-CONTROL ::= { ControlsProcessed IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-controlProcessed } id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32} ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE { bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference } -- Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility cmc-identityProofV2 CMC-CONTROL ::= { IdentityProofV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProofV2 } id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 } IdentityProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE { proofAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {WitnessAlgs}}, macAlgId AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}}, witness OCTET STRING } cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 CMC-CONTROL ::= { PopLinkWitnessV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 } id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 } PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE { keyGenAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION, {KeyDevAlgs}}, macAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}}, witness OCTET STRING } KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {kda-PBKDF2, ...} END 13. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5755 PKIXAttributeCertificate-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert-02(47)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, SecurityCategory{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE, SECURITY-CATEGORY FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} -- IMPORTed module OIDs MAY change if [PKIXPROF] changes -- PKIX Certificate Extensions CertificateSerialNumber, UniqueIdentifier, id-pkix, id-pe, id-kp, id-ad, id-at, SIGNED{}, SignatureAlgorithms FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} GeneralName, GeneralNames, id-ce, ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier, ext-AuthorityInfoAccess, ext-CRLDistributionPoints FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} ContentInfo FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }; -- Define the set of extensions that can appear. -- Some of these are imported from PKIX Cert AttributeCertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-auditIdentity | ext-targetInformation | ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier | ext-AuthorityInfoAccess | ext-CRLDistributionPoints | ext-noRevAvail | ext-ac-proxying | ext-aaControls, ... } ext-auditIdentity EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-ac-auditIdentity} ext-targetInformation EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX Targets IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-targetInformation } ext-noRevAvail EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-noRevAvail} ext-ac-proxying EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ProxyInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-ac-proxying} ext-aaControls EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AAControls IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-aaControls} -- Define the set of attributes used here AttributesDefined ATTRIBUTE ::= { at-authenticationInfo | at-accesIdentity | at-chargingIdentity | at-group | at-role | at-clearance | at-encAttrs, ...} at-authenticationInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE SvceAuthInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-aca-authenticationInfo} at-accesIdentity ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE SvceAuthInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-aca-accessIdentity} at-chargingIdentity ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE IetfAttrSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-aca-chargingIdentity} at-group ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE IetfAttrSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-aca-group} at-role ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE RoleSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-at-role} at-clearance ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE Clearance IDENTIFIED BY id-at-clearance} at-clearance-RFC3281 ATTRIBUTE ::= {TYPE Clearance-rfc3281 IDENTIFIED BY id-at-clearance-rfc3281 } at-encAttrs ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE ContentInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-aca-encAttrs} -- -- OIDs used by Attribute Certificate Extensions -- id-pe-ac-auditIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 4 } id-pe-aaControls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 6 } id-pe-ac-proxying OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 10 } id-ce-targetInformation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 55 } id-ce-noRevAvail OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 56 } -- -- OIDs used by Attribute Certificate Attributes -- id-aca OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 10 } id-aca-authenticationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 1 } id-aca-accessIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 2 } id-aca-chargingIdentity OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 3 } id-aca-group OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 4 } -- { id-aca 5 } is reserved id-aca-encAttrs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 6 } id-at-role OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 72} id-at-clearance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) attributeType(4) clearance (55) } -- Uncomment the following declaration and comment the above line if -- using the id-at-clearance attribute as defined in [RFC3281] -- id-at-clearance ::= id-at-clearance-3281 id-at-clearance-rfc3281 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) module(1) selected-attribute-types(5) clearance (55) } -- -- The syntax of an Attribute Certificate -- AttributeCertificate ::= SIGNED{AttributeCertificateInfo} AttributeCertificateInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version AttCertVersion, -- version is v2 holder Holder, issuer AttCertIssuer, signature AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, attrCertValidityPeriod AttCertValidityPeriod, attributes SEQUENCE OF AttributeSet{{AttributesDefined}}, issuerUniqueID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, extensions Extensions{{AttributeCertExtensions}} OPTIONAL } AttCertVersion ::= INTEGER { v2(1) } Holder ::= SEQUENCE { baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL, -- the issuer and serial number of -- the holder's Public Key Certificate entityName [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, -- the name of the claimant or role objectDigestInfo [2] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL -- used to directly authenticate the -- holder, for example, an executable } ObjectDigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { digestedObjectType ENUMERATED { publicKey (0), publicKeyCert (1), otherObjectTypes (2) }, -- otherObjectTypes MUST NOT -- be used in this profile otherObjectTypeID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, objectDigest BIT STRING } AttCertIssuer ::= CHOICE { v1Form GeneralNames, -- MUST NOT be used in this -- profile v2Form [0] V2Form -- v2 only } V2Form ::= SEQUENCE { issuerName GeneralNames OPTIONAL, baseCertificateID [0] IssuerSerial OPTIONAL, objectDigestInfo [1] ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL -- issuerName MUST be present in this profile -- baseCertificateID and objectDigestInfo MUST -- NOT be present in this profile } IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE { issuer GeneralNames, serial CertificateSerialNumber, issuerUID UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL } AttCertValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE { notBeforeTime GeneralizedTime, notAfterTime GeneralizedTime } -- -- Syntax used by Attribute Certificate Extensions -- Targets ::= SEQUENCE OF Target Target ::= CHOICE { targetName [0] GeneralName, targetGroup [1] GeneralName, targetCert [2] TargetCert } TargetCert ::= SEQUENCE { targetCertificate IssuerSerial, targetName GeneralName OPTIONAL, certDigestInfo ObjectDigestInfo OPTIONAL } AAControls ::= SEQUENCE { pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL, permittedAttrs [0] AttrSpec OPTIONAL, excludedAttrs [1] AttrSpec OPTIONAL, permitUnSpecified BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE } AttrSpec::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ProxyInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF Targets -- -- Syntax used by Attribute Certificate Attributes -- IetfAttrSyntax ::= SEQUENCE { policyAuthority[0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, values SEQUENCE OF CHOICE { octets OCTET STRING, oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, string UTF8String } } SvceAuthInfo ::= SEQUENCE { service GeneralName, ident GeneralName, authInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } RoleSyntax ::= SEQUENCE { roleAuthority [0] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, roleName [1] GeneralName } Clearance ::= SEQUENCE { policyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, classList ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified}, securityCategories SET OF SecurityCategory {{SupportedSecurityCategories}} OPTIONAL } -- Uncomment the following lines to support deprecated clearance -- syntax and comment out previous Clearance. -- Clearance ::= Clearance-rfc3281 Clearance-rfc3281 ::= SEQUENCE { policyId [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, classList [1] ClassList DEFAULT {unclassified}, securityCategories [2] SET OF SecurityCategory-rfc3281 {{SupportedSecurityCategories}} OPTIONAL } ClassList ::= BIT STRING { unmarked (0), unclassified (1), restricted (2), confidential (3), secret (4), topSecret (5) } SupportedSecurityCategories SECURITY-CATEGORY ::= { ... } SecurityCategory-rfc3281{SECURITY-CATEGORY:Supported} ::= SEQUENCE { type [0] IMPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY. &id({Supported}), value [1] EXPLICIT SECURITY-CATEGORY. &Type({Supported}{@type}) } ACClearAttrs ::= SEQUENCE { acIssuer GeneralName, acSerial INTEGER, attrs SEQUENCE OF AttributeSet{{AttributesDefined}} } END 14. ASN.1 Module for RFC 5280, Explicit and Implicit
EID 2839 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: 14

Original Text:

None

Corrected Text:

None
Notes:
anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } does not appear in the PKIX1Implicit-2009 module. It appears in the body of RFC 5280 and in the corresponding ASN.1 module in RFC 5280.
EID 3692 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: 14

Original Text:

crlExtensions EXTENSION ::= {
           ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier | ext-IssuerAltName |
           ext-CRLNumber | ext-DeltaCRLIndicator |
           ext-IssuingDistributionPoint |  ext-FreshestCRL, ... }

Corrected Text:

crlExtensions EXTENSION ::= {
           ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier | ext-IssuerAltName |
           ext-CRLNumber | ext-DeltaCRLIndicator |
           ext-IssuingDistributionPoint |  ext-FreshestCRL | 
           ext-AuthorityInfoAccess, ... }
Notes:
Section 5.2.7 of RFC 5280 allows AIA to be a CRL extension.
Note that many of the changes in this module are similar or the same as the changes made in more recent versions of X.509 itself. PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE, SingleAttribute{} FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} CertExtensions, CrlExtensions, CrlEntryExtensions FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} SignatureAlgs, PublicKeys FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 56} SignatureAlgs, PublicKeys FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54)} ORAddress FROM PKIX-X400Address-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-x400address-02(60)}; id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- PKIX arcs id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 1 } -- arc for private certificate extensions id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } -- arc for policy qualifier types id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } -- arc for extended key purpose OIDs id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } -- arc for access descriptors -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } -- OID for CPS qualifier id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } -- OID for user notice qualifier -- access descriptor definitions id-ad-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 1 } id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 2 } id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 3 } id-ad-caRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 5 } -- attribute data types AttributeType ::= ATTRIBUTE.&id -- Replaced by SingleAttribute{} -- -- AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { -- type ATTRIBUTE.&id({SupportedAttributes}), -- value ATTRIBUTE.&Type({SupportedAttributes}{@type}) } -- -- Suggested naming attributes: Definition of the following -- information object set may be augmented to meet local -- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may -- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations. -- All attributes are presented in pairs: the AttributeType -- followed by the type definition for the corresponding -- AttributeValue. -- Arc for standard naming attributes id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 } -- Naming attributes of type X520name id-at-name AttributeType ::= { id-at 41 } at-name ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE X520name IDENTIFIED BY id-at-name } id-at-surname AttributeType ::= { id-at 4 } at-surname ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE X520name IDENTIFIED BY id-at-surname } id-at-givenName AttributeType ::= { id-at 42 } at-givenName ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE X520name IDENTIFIED BY id-at-givenName } id-at-initials AttributeType ::= { id-at 43 } at-initials ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE X520name IDENTIFIED BY id-at-initials } id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 44 } at-generationQualifier ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE X520name IDENTIFIED BY id-at-generationQualifier } -- Directory string type -- DirectoryString{INTEGER:maxSize} ::= CHOICE { teletexString TeletexString(SIZE (1..maxSize)), printableString PrintableString(SIZE (1..maxSize)), bmpString BMPString(SIZE (1..maxSize)), universalString UniversalString(SIZE (1..maxSize)), uTF8String UTF8String(SIZE (1..maxSize)) } X520name ::= DirectoryString {ub-name} -- Naming attributes of type X520CommonName id-at-commonName AttributeType ::= { id-at 3 } at-x520CommonName ATTRIBUTE ::= {TYPE X520CommonName IDENTIFIED BY id-at-commonName } X520CommonName ::= DirectoryString {ub-common-name} -- Naming attributes of type X520LocalityName id-at-localityName AttributeType ::= { id-at 7 } at-x520LocalityName ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE X520LocalityName IDENTIFIED BY id-at-localityName } X520LocalityName ::= DirectoryString {ub-locality-name} -- Naming attributes of type X520StateOrProvinceName id-at-stateOrProvinceName AttributeType ::= { id-at 8 } at-x520StateOrProvinceName ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-state-name} IDENTIFIED BY id-at-stateOrProvinceName } X520StateOrProvinceName ::= DirectoryString {ub-state-name} -- Naming attributes of type X520OrganizationName id-at-organizationName AttributeType ::= { id-at 10 } at-x520OrganizationName ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-organization-name} IDENTIFIED BY id-at-organizationName } X520OrganizationName ::= DirectoryString {ub-organization-name} -- Naming attributes of type X520OrganizationalUnitName id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType ::= { id-at 11 } at-x520OrganizationalUnitName ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-organizational-unit-name} IDENTIFIED BY id-at-organizationalUnitName } X520OrganizationalUnitName ::= DirectoryString {ub-organizational-unit-name} -- Naming attributes of type X520Title id-at-title AttributeType ::= { id-at 12 } at-x520Title ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString { ub-title } IDENTIFIED BY id-at-title } -- Naming attributes of type X520dnQualifier id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType ::= { id-at 46 } at-x520dnQualifier ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE PrintableString IDENTIFIED BY id-at-dnQualifier } -- Naming attributes of type X520countryName (digraph from IS 3166) id-at-countryName AttributeType ::= { id-at 6 } at-x520countryName ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE PrintableString (SIZE (2)) IDENTIFIED BY id-at-countryName } -- Naming attributes of type X520SerialNumber id-at-serialNumber AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 } at-x520SerialNumber ATTRIBUTE ::= {TYPE PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-serial-number)) IDENTIFIED BY id-at-serialNumber } -- Naming attributes of type X520Pseudonym id-at-pseudonym AttributeType ::= { id-at 65 } at-x520Pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-pseudonym} IDENTIFIED BY id-at-pseudonym } -- Naming attributes of type DomainComponent (from RFC 2247) id-domainComponent AttributeType ::= { itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) 25 } at-domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= {TYPE IA5String IDENTIFIED BY id-domainComponent } -- Legacy attributes pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } id-emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } at-emailAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= {TYPE IA5String (SIZE (1..ub-emailaddress-length)) IDENTIFIED BY id-emailAddress } -- naming data types -- Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- rdnSequence RDNSequence } RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF SingleAttribute { {SupportedAttributes} } -- These are the known name elements for a DN SupportedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= { at-name | at-surname | at-givenName | at-initials | at-generationQualifier | at-x520CommonName | at-x520LocalityName | at-x520StateOrProvinceName | at-x520OrganizationName | at-x520OrganizationalUnitName | at-x520Title | at-x520dnQualifier | at-x520countryName | at-x520SerialNumber | at-x520Pseudonym | at-domainComponent | at-emailAddress, ... } -- -- Certificate- and CRL-specific structures begin here -- Certificate ::= SIGNED{TBSCertificate} TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] Version DEFAULT v1, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, signature AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, issuer Name, validity Validity, subject Name, subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, ... , [[2: -- If present, version MUST be v2 issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL ]], [[3: -- If present, version MUST be v3 -- extensions [3] Extensions{{CertExtensions}} OPTIONAL ]], ... } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER Validity ::= SEQUENCE { notBefore Time, notAfter Time } Time ::= CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {PublicKeyAlgorithms}}, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- CRL structures CertificateList ::= SIGNED{TBSCertList} TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { version Version OPTIONAL, -- if present, MUST be v2 signature AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithms}}, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL, revokedCertificates SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, revocationDate Time, ... , [[2: -- if present, version MUST be v2 crlEntryExtensions Extensions{{CrlEntryExtensions}} OPTIONAL ]], ... } OPTIONAL, ... , [[2: -- if present, version MUST be v2 crlExtensions [0] Extensions{{CrlExtensions}} OPTIONAL ]], ... } -- Version, Time, CertificateSerialNumber, and Extensions were -- defined earlier for use in the certificate structure -- -- The two object sets below should be expanded to include -- those algorithms which are supported by the system. -- -- For example: -- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { -- PKIXAlgs-2008.SignatureAlgs, ..., -- - - RFC 3279 provides the base set -- PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-ALGORITHMS.SignatureAlgs | -- - - RFC 4055 provides extension algs -- OtherModule.SignatureAlgs -- - - RFC XXXX provides additional extension algs -- } SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { PKIXAlgs-2009.SignatureAlgs, ..., PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009.SignatureAlgs } PublicKeyAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= { PKIXAlgs-2009.PublicKeys, ..., PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009.PublicKeys} -- Upper Bounds ub-state-name INTEGER ::= 128 ub-organization-name INTEGER ::= 64 ub-organizational-unit-name INTEGER ::= 64 ub-title INTEGER ::= 64 ub-serial-number INTEGER ::= 64 ub-pseudonym INTEGER ::= 128 ub-emailaddress-length INTEGER ::= 255 ub-locality-name INTEGER ::= 128 ub-common-name INTEGER ::= 64 ub-name INTEGER ::= 32768 -- Note - upper bounds on string types, such as TeletexString, are -- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a -- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold -- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets or twice the specified -- upper bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for -- TeletexString. For UTF8String or UniversalString, at least four -- times the upper bound should be allowed. -- Information object classes used in the definition -- of certificates and CRLs -- Parameterized Type SIGNED -- -- Three different versions of doing SIGNED: -- 1. Simple and close to the previous version -- -- SIGNED{ToBeSigned} ::= SEQUENCE { -- toBeSigned ToBeSigned, -- algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, -- {SignatureAlgorithms}}, -- signature BIT STRING -- } -- 2. From Authenticated Framework -- -- SIGNED{ToBeSigned} ::= SEQUENCE { -- toBeSigned ToBeSigned, -- COMPONENTS OF SIGNATURE{ToBeSigned} -- } -- SIGNATURE{ToBeSigned} ::= SEQUENCE { -- algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, -- encrypted ENCRYPTED-HASH{ToBeSigned} -- } -- ENCRYPTED-HASH{ToBeSigned} ::= -- BIT STRING -- (CONSTRAINED BY { -- shall be the result of applying a hashing procedure to -- the DER-encoded (see 4.1) octets of a value of -- ToBeSigned and then applying an encipherment procedure -- to those octets -- }) -- -- -- 3. A more complex version, but one that automatically ties -- together both the signature algorithm and the -- signature value for automatic decoding. -- SIGNED{ToBeSigned} ::= SEQUENCE { toBeSigned ToBeSigned, algorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE { algorithm SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM. &id({SignatureAlgorithms}), parameters SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM. &Params({SignatureAlgorithms} {@algorithmIdentifier.algorithm}) OPTIONAL }, signature BIT STRING (CONTAINING SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM.&Value( {SignatureAlgorithms} {@algorithmIdentifier.algorithm})) } END PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } id-pe, id-kp, id-qt-unotice, id-qt-cps, ORAddress, Name, RelativeDistinguishedName, CertificateSerialNumber, DirectoryString{}, SupportedAttributes FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }; CertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier | ext-SubjectKeyIdentifier | ext-KeyUsage | ext-PrivateKeyUsagePeriod | ext-CertificatePolicies | ext-PolicyMappings | ext-SubjectAltName | ext-IssuerAltName | ext-SubjectDirectoryAttributes | ext-BasicConstraints | ext-NameConstraints | ext-PolicyConstraints | ext-ExtKeyUsage | ext-CRLDistributionPoints | ext-InhibitAnyPolicy | ext-FreshestCRL | ext-AuthorityInfoAccess | ext-SubjectInfoAccessSyntax, ... } CrlExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier | ext-IssuerAltName | ext-CRLNumber | ext-DeltaCRLIndicator | ext-IssuingDistributionPoint | ext-FreshestCRL, ... } CrlEntryExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-CRLReason | ext-CertificateIssuer | ext-HoldInstructionCode | ext-InvalidityDate, ... } -- Shared arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29 } -- authority key identifier OID and syntax ext-AuthorityKeyIdentifier EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AuthorityKeyIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier } id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., authorityCertIssuer PRESENT, authorityCertSerialNumber PRESENT } | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., authorityCertIssuer ABSENT, authorityCertSerialNumber ABSENT }) KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING -- subject key identifier OID and syntax ext-SubjectKeyIdentifier EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX KeyIdentifier IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier } id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } -- key usage extension OID and syntax ext-KeyUsage EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX KeyUsage IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-keyUsage } id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } KeyUsage ::= BIT STRING { digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), -- recent editions of X.509 have -- renamed this bit to -- contentCommitment keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3), keyAgreement (4), keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6), encipherOnly (7), decipherOnly (8) } -- private key usage period extension OID and syntax ext-PrivateKeyUsagePeriod EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX PrivateKeyUsagePeriod IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod } id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 16 } PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } (WITH COMPONENTS {..., notBefore PRESENT } | WITH COMPONENTS {..., notAfter PRESENT }) -- certificate policies extension OID and syntax ext-CertificatePolicies EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CertificatePolicies IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-certificatePolicies} id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } CertificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { policyQualifierId CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER. &id({PolicyQualifierId}), qualifier CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER. &Type({PolicyQualifierId}{@policyQualifierId})} -- Implementations that recognize additional policy qualifiers MUST -- augment the following definition for PolicyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= { pqid-cps | pqid-unotice, ... } pqid-cps CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= { CPSuri IDENTIFIED BY id-qt-cps } pqid-unotice CERT-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= { UserNotice IDENTIFIED BY id-qt-unotice } -- CPS pointer qualifier CPSuri ::= IA5String -- user notice qualifier UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL} -- -- This is not made explicit in the text -- -- {WITH COMPONENTS {..., noticeRef PRESENT} | -- WITH COMPONENTS {..., DisplayText PRESENT }} NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { organization DisplayText, noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } DisplayText ::= CHOICE { ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } -- policy mapping extension OID and syntax ext-PolicyMappings EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX PolicyMappings IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-policyMappings } id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } PolicyMappings ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE { issuerDomainPolicy CertPolicyId, subjectDomainPolicy CertPolicyId } -- subject alternative name extension OID and syntax ext-SubjectAltName EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectAltName } id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName GeneralName ::= CHOICE { otherName [0] INSTANCE OF OTHER-NAME, rfc822Name [1] IA5String, dNSName [2] IA5String, x400Address [3] ORAddress, directoryName [4] Name, ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } -- AnotherName replaces OTHER-NAME ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER, as -- TYPE-IDENTIFIER is not supported in the '88 ASN.1 syntax OTHER-NAME ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString {ubMax} OPTIONAL, partyName [1] DirectoryString {ubMax} } -- issuer alternative name extension OID and syntax ext-IssuerAltName EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-issuerAltName } id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } ext-SubjectDirectoryAttributes EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX SubjectDirectoryAttributes IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes } id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } SubjectDirectoryAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeSet{{SupportedAttributes}} -- basic constraints extension OID and syntax ext-BasicConstraints EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX BasicConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-basicConstraints } id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } -- name constraints extension OID and syntax ext-NameConstraints EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NameConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-nameConstraints } id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL, excludedSubtrees [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL } -- -- This is a constraint in the issued certificates by CAs, but is -- not a requirement on EEs. -- -- (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedSubtrees PRESENT} | -- WITH COMPONENTS { ..., excludedSubtrees PRESENT }} GeneralSubtrees ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralSubtree GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { base GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } BaseDistance ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) -- policy constraints extension OID and syntax ext-PolicyConstraints EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX PolicyConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-policyConstraints } id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } PolicyConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL, inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL } -- -- This is a constraint in the issued certificates by CAs, -- but is not a requirement for EEs -- -- (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., requireExplicitPolicy PRESENT} | -- WITH COMPONENTS { ..., inhibitPolicyMapping PRESENT}) SkipCerts ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) -- CRL distribution points extension OID and syntax ext-CRLDistributionPoints EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CRLDistributionPoints IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints} id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 31} CRLDistributionPoints ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF DistributionPoint DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, reasons [1] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, cRLIssuer [2] GeneralNames OPTIONAL } -- -- This is not a requirement in the text, but it seems as if it -- should be -- --(WITH COMPONENTS {..., distributionPoint PRESENT} | -- WITH COMPONENTS {..., cRLIssuer PRESENT}) DistributionPointName ::= CHOICE { fullName [0] GeneralNames, nameRelativeToCRLIssuer [1] RelativeDistinguishedName } ReasonFlags ::= BIT STRING { unused (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), privilegeWithdrawn (7), aACompromise (8) } -- extended key usage extension OID and syntax ext-ExtKeyUsage EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ExtKeyUsageSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-extKeyUsage } id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ce 37} ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- permit unspecified key uses anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } -- extended key purpose OIDs id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } -- inhibit any policy OID and syntax ext-InhibitAnyPolicy EXTENSION ::= {SYNTAX SkipCerts IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy } id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } -- freshest (delta)CRL extension OID and syntax ext-FreshestCRL EXTENSION ::= {SYNTAX CRLDistributionPoints IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-freshestCRL } id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } -- authority info access ext-AuthorityInfoAccess EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-authorityInfoAccess } id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 1 } AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription AccessDescription ::= SEQUENCE { accessMethod OBJECT IDENTIFIER, accessLocation GeneralName } -- subject info access ext-SubjectInfoAccessSyntax EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX SubjectInfoAccessSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-subjectInfoAccess } id-pe-subjectInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 11 } SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessDescription -- CRL number extension OID and syntax CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) ext-CRLNumber EXTENSION ::= {SYNTAX CRLNumber IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-cRLNumber } id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }
EID 3626 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: 14

Original Text:

   -- CRL number extension OID and syntax
   ext-CRLNumber EXTENSION ::= {SYNTAX
       INTEGER (0..MAX) IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-cRLNumber }
   id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }

   CRLNumber ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

Corrected Text:

   -- CRL number extension OID and syntax
   CRLNumber ::= INTEGER  (0..MAX)

   ext-CRLNumber EXTENSION ::= {SYNTAX
       CRLNumber IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-cRLNumber }
   id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 }
Notes:
The CRLNumber extension was not defined to use the CRLNumber type. It should use the CRLNumber type. This is a corrected resubmission of an earlier errata submission that included an error.
-- issuing distribution point extension OID and syntax ext-IssuingDistributionPoint EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX IssuingDistributionPoint IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint } id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 28 } IssuingDistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE { distributionPoint [0] DistributionPointName OPTIONAL, onlyContainsUserCerts [1] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsCACerts [2] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlySomeReasons [3] ReasonFlags OPTIONAL, indirectCRL [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, onlyContainsAttributeCerts [5] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } -- at most one of onlyContainsUserCerts, onlyContainsCACerts, -- or onlyContainsAttributeCerts may be set to TRUE. ext-DeltaCRLIndicator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CRLNumber IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator } id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 27 } -- CRL reasons extension OID and syntax ext-CRLReason EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CRLReason IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-cRLReasons } id-ce-cRLReasons OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 21 } CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { unspecified (0), keyCompromise (1), cACompromise (2), affiliationChanged (3), superseded (4), cessationOfOperation (5), certificateHold (6), removeFromCRL (8), privilegeWithdrawn (9), aACompromise (10) } -- certificate issuer CRL entry extension OID and syntax ext-CertificateIssuer EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX GeneralNames IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-certificateIssuer } id-ce-certificateIssuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 29 } -- hold instruction extension OID and syntax ext-HoldInstructionCode EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX OBJECT IDENTIFIER IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-holdInstructionCode } id-ce-holdInstructionCode OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 23 } -- ANSI x9 holdinstructions holdInstruction OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) member-body(2) us(840) x9cm(10040) 2} id-holdinstruction-none OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 1} -- deprecated id-holdinstruction-callissuer OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 2} id-holdinstruction-reject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {holdInstruction 3} -- invalidity date CRL entry extension OID and syntax ext-InvalidityDate EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX GeneralizedTime IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-invalidityDate } id-ce-invalidityDate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 24 } -- Upper bounds ubMax INTEGER ::= 32768 END -- -- This module is used to isolate all the X.400 naming information. -- There is no reason to expect this to occur in a PKIX certificate. -- PKIX-X400Address-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-x400address-02(60) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- X.400 address syntax starts here ORAddress ::= SEQUENCE { built-in-standard-attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes, built-in-domain-defined-attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-domain-defined-attributes extension-attributes ExtensionAttributes OPTIONAL } -- Built-in Standard Attributes BuiltInStandardAttributes ::= SEQUENCE { country-name CountryName OPTIONAL, administration-domain-name AdministrationDomainName OPTIONAL, network-address [0] IMPLICIT NetworkAddress OPTIONAL, -- see also extended-network-address terminal-identifier [1] IMPLICIT TerminalIdentifier OPTIONAL, private-domain-name [2] PrivateDomainName OPTIONAL, organization-name [3] IMPLICIT OrganizationName OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-organization-name numeric-user-identifier [4] IMPLICIT NumericUserIdentifier OPTIONAL, personal-name [5] IMPLICIT PersonalName OPTIONAL, -- see also teletex-personal-name organizational-unit-names [6] IMPLICIT OrganizationalUnitNames OPTIONAL } -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names CountryName ::= [APPLICATION 1] CHOICE { x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } AdministrationDomainName ::= [APPLICATION 2] CHOICE { numeric NumericString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (0..ub-domain-name-length)) } NetworkAddress ::= X121Address -- see also extended-network-address X121Address ::= NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-x121-address-length)) TerminalIdentifier ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-terminal-id-length)) PrivateDomainName ::= CHOICE { numeric NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)), printable PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-name-length)) } OrganizationName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) -- see also teletex-organization-name NumericUserIdentifier ::= NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-numeric-user-id-length)) PersonalName ::= SET { surname [0] IMPLICIT PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1] IMPLICIT PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] IMPLICIT PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] IMPLICIT PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL } -- see also teletex-personal-name OrganizationalUnitNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF OrganizationalUnitName -- see also teletex-organizational-unit-names OrganizationalUnitName ::= PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) -- Built-in Domain-defined Attributes BuiltInDomainDefinedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute BuiltInDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { type PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } -- Extension Attributes ExtensionAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-extension-attributes) OF ExtensionAttribute EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS { &id INTEGER (0..ub-extension-attributes) UNIQUE, &Type } WITH SYNTAX { &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id } ExtensionAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { extension-attribute-type [0] IMPLICIT EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE. &id({SupportedExtensionAttributes}), extension-attribute-value [1] EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE. &Type({SupportedExtensionAttributes} {@extension-attribute-type})} SupportedExtensionAttributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { ea-commonName | ea-teletexCommonName | ea-teletexOrganizationName | ea-teletexPersonalName | ea-teletexOrganizationalUnitNames | ea-pDSName | ea-physicalDeliveryCountryName | ea-postalCode | ea-physicalDeliveryOfficeName | ea-physicalDeliveryOfficeNumber | ea-extensionORAddressComponents | ea-physicalDeliveryPersonalName | ea-physicalDeliveryOrganizationName | ea-extensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents | ea-unformattedPostalAddress | ea-streetAddress | ea-postOfficeBoxAddress | ea-posteRestanteAddress | ea-uniquePostalName | ea-localPostalAttributes | ea-extendedNetworkAddress | ea-terminalType | ea-teletexDomainDefinedAttributes, ... } -- Extension types and attribute values ea-commonName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) IDENTIFIED BY 1 } ea-teletexCommonName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name-length)) IDENTIFIED BY 2 } ea-teletexOrganizationName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE::= { TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organization-name-length)) IDENTIFIED BY 3 } ea-teletexPersonalName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {SET { surname [0] IMPLICIT TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-surname-length)), given-name [1] IMPLICIT TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-given-name-length)) OPTIONAL, initials [2] IMPLICIT TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-initials-length)) OPTIONAL, generation-qualifier [3] IMPLICIT TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-generation-qualifier-length)) OPTIONAL } IDENTIFIED BY 4 } ea-teletexOrganizationalUnitNames EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-organizational-units) OF TeletexOrganizationalUnitName IDENTIFIED BY 5 } TeletexOrganizationalUnitName ::= TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-organizational-unit-name-length)) ea-pDSName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-name-length)) IDENTIFIED BY 7 } ea-physicalDeliveryCountryName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { CHOICE { x121-dcc-code NumericString (SIZE (ub-country-name-numeric-length)), iso-3166-alpha2-code PrintableString (SIZE (ub-country-name-alpha-length)) } IDENTIFIED BY 8 } ea-postalCode EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { CHOICE { numeric-code NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)), printable-code PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-postal-code-length)) } IDENTIFIED BY 9 } ea-physicalDeliveryOfficeName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 10 } ea-physicalDeliveryOfficeNumber EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 11 } ea-extensionORAddressComponents EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 12 } ea-physicalDeliveryPersonalName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 13} ea-physicalDeliveryOrganizationName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 14 } ea-extensionPhysicalDeliveryAddressComponents EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 15 } ea-unformattedPostalAddress EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { SET { printable-address SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-pds-physical-address-lines) OF PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-unformatted-address-length)) OPTIONAL } IDENTIFIED BY 16 } ea-streetAddress EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 17 } ea-postOfficeBoxAddress EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 18 } ea-posteRestanteAddress EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 19 } ea-uniquePostalName EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 20 } ea-localPostalAttributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {PDSParameter IDENTIFIED BY 21 } PDSParameter ::= SET { printable-string PrintableString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL, teletex-string TeletexString (SIZE(1..ub-pds-parameter-length)) OPTIONAL } ea-extendedNetworkAddress EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { CHOICE { e163-4-address SEQUENCE { number [0] IMPLICIT NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-number-length)), sub-address [1] IMPLICIT NumericString (SIZE (1..ub-e163-4-sub-address-length)) OPTIONAL }, psap-address [0] IMPLICIT PresentationAddress } IDENTIFIED BY 22 } PresentationAddress ::= SEQUENCE { pSelector [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, sSelector [1] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, tSelector [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, nAddresses [3] EXPLICIT SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF OCTET STRING } ea-terminalType EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= {INTEGER { telex (3), teletex (4), g3-facsimile (5), g4-facsimile (6), ia5-terminal (7), videotex (8) } (0..ub-integer-options) IDENTIFIED BY 23 } -- Extension Domain-defined Attributes ea-teletexDomainDefinedAttributes EXTENSION-ATTRIBUTE ::= { SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attributes) OF TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute IDENTIFIED BY 6 } TeletexDomainDefinedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { type TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length)), value TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length)) } -- specifications of Upper Bounds MUST be regarded as mandatory -- from Annex B of ITU-T X.411 Reference Definition of MTS Parameter -- Upper Bounds -- Upper Bounds ub-match INTEGER ::= 128 ub-common-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-country-name-alpha-length INTEGER ::= 2 ub-country-name-numeric-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-domain-defined-attributes INTEGER ::= 4 ub-domain-defined-attribute-type-length INTEGER ::= 8 ub-domain-defined-attribute-value-length INTEGER ::= 128 ub-domain-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-extension-attributes INTEGER ::= 256 ub-e163-4-number-length INTEGER ::= 15 ub-e163-4-sub-address-length INTEGER ::= 40 ub-generation-qualifier-length INTEGER ::= 3 ub-given-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-initials-length INTEGER ::= 5 ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256 ub-numeric-user-id-length INTEGER ::= 32 ub-organization-name-length INTEGER ::= 64 ub-organizational-unit-name-length INTEGER ::= 32 ub-organizational-units INTEGER ::= 4 ub-pds-name-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-pds-parameter-length INTEGER ::= 30 ub-pds-physical-address-lines INTEGER ::= 6 ub-postal-code-length INTEGER ::= 16 ub-surname-length INTEGER ::= 40 ub-terminal-id-length INTEGER ::= 24 ub-unformatted-address-length INTEGER ::= 180 ub-x121-address-length INTEGER ::= 16 -- Note - upper bounds on string types, such as TeletexString, are -- measured in characters. Excepting PrintableString or IA5String, a -- significantly greater number of octets will be required to hold -- such a value. As a minimum, 16 octets or twice the specified -- upper bound, whichever is the larger, should be allowed for -- TeletexString. For UTF8String or UniversalString, at least four -- times the upper bound should be allowed. END 15. Security Considerations Even though all the RFCs in this document are security-related, the document itself does not have any security considerations. The ASN.1 modules keep the same bits-on-the-wire as the modules that they replace. 16. Normative References [ASN1-2002] ITU-T, "ITU-T Recommendation X.680, X.681, X.682, and X.683", ITU-T X.680, X.681, X.682, and X.683, 2002. [RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999. [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, November 2000. [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002. [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3852, July 2004. [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. [RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, September 2005. [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, September 2005. [RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007. [RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008. [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information", RFC 5480, March 2009. [RFC5755] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization", RFC 5755, January 2010. [RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911, June 2010. Authors' Addresses Paul Hoffman VPN Consortium 127 Segre Place Santa Cruz, CA 95060 US Phone: 1-831-426-9827 EMail: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org Jim Schaad Soaring Hawk Consulting EMail: jimsch@exmsft.com
EID 3130 (Verified) is as follows:

Section: GLOBAL

Original Text:

  ct-foo CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { FooType IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-foo }

Corrected Text:

  ct-foo CONTENT-TYPE ::=
      { TYPE FooType IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-foo }
Notes:
Of course, 'ct-foo', 'FooType', and 'id-ct-foo' need to be replaced as appropriate for the use of CONTENT-TYPE in RFC 5912. CONTENT-TYPE is imported from a module defined in RFC 5911, and errata 2612 makes a change to that definition. Therefore, 'TYPE' needs to be added each time a content type is defined to align with errata 2612.

The definitions that need to be updated are:
ct-encKeyWithID,
ct-scvp-certValRequest,
ct-scvp-certValResponse,
ct-scvp-valPolRequest,
ct-scvp-valPolResponse,
ct-PKIData, and
ct-PKIResponse.